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ABSTRACT 
The security of its citizens is often regarded as the democratic state's primary raison 
d'etre. However, with increasing crime and perceptions of insecurity among 
citizens, along with actual and perceived state policing inadequacies, citizens 
around the world have sought to make alternative arrangements for their security. 
The explosion of private alternatives to state policing has resulted in the need for 
the replacement of former static definitions of policing by more fluid 
understandings of what policing entails . Policing is no longer an activity undertaken 
exclusively by the 'state po lice.' Policing needs to be understood within a 
framework which recognises the existence of a variety of state, commercial, 
community groups and individuals which exist within loose and sometimes 
informal, sometimes formal, networks to provide for the security of citizens. 
Preceding the country's transition to democracy in 1994 'state' policing in South 
Africa was aimed at monitoring and suppressing the black population and as a result 
it conducted itself in a largely militaristic way. When the government of national 
unity assumed power in 1994 it was indisputable that the South African Police had 
to undergo major reform if it was to play an effective, co-operative and accountable 
role in a democratic South Africa. While state policing has unquestionably 
undergone enormous changes since the advent of democracy in 1994, so too has 
non-state policing. It is widely accepted that the dividing line between state and 
non-state policing in South Africa is increasingly blurred. 
Policing, by its very nature, holds the potential to threaten democracy. Consequently 
it is important that policing is democratically controlled. According to the Law 
Commission of Canada four values and principles - justice, equality, accountability, 
and efficiency - should support policing in a democracy. 
This thesis is a case study of policing in Grahamstown, a small city in South 
Africa's Eastern Cape province. It will be shown that the policing problem that 
currently plagues Grahamstown, and by extension South Africa, is not simply the 
result of a shortage of providers but rather a problem of co-coordinating and 
monitoring security governance to ensure that the city does not further develop into 
a society where the wealthy have greater access to security than the poor. 
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CHAPTERl 
POLICING AND DEMOCRACY: A CONCEPTUAL INTRODUCTION 
The security of its citizens is often regarded as the democratic state' s primary raison d'etre. 
According to Charles Tilly 'early in the state-making process many parties shared the right to 
use violence' (1985: 511) but as state forces became more 'unified and permanent' (ibid: 
512) so governments came to control the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. However, 
while public policing may have been the dominant form of policing in developed nations 
during the industrial era, the situation today is fundamentally different. Since the 1960s the 
'trend towards absolute state control of the criminal justice sphere has undergone a reversal 
in a number of developed capitalist states' (Schonteich, 1999:2). 
With increasing crime and perceptions of insecurity among citizens, along with actual and 
perceived state policing inadequacies, citizens around the world have sought to make 
alternative arrangements for their security. As Karina Landman and Martin Schonteich 
highlight, 'one of the consequences of the state's inability to protect the life and property of 
its citizens - especially in developing countries - is the formation of private alternatives to 
crime prevention and control' (Landman & Schonteich, 2002:71). So, whi le the state police 
remain an important player in the provision of security they have ceased to be the only (or in 
some cases even the principal) actor (see for example Loader and Walker, 2001: I 0). 
The explosion of private alternatives to state policing has resulted in the need for the 
replacement of former static definitions of policing by more fluid understandings of what 
policing entails. Policing is no longer an activity undertaken exclusively by the 'state police. ' 
As David Bayley wrote 'Policing has become a responsibility explicitly shared between 
government and its citizens' (Bayley, 1996:1), it now ' belongs to everybody - in activity, in 
responsibility and in oversight' (ibid: 5). 
Policing in Contemporary South Africa 
In 1999 the then National Pol ice Commissioner, Jackie Selebi and the Minister of 
Safety and Security, Steve Tshwete promised South Africans that serious crime would 
drop within four months and that Johannesburg would no longer be the world 's crime 
capital (Louw and Schonteich, 200 I :41). However, this did not materialize and South 
Africans were left wondering why it was that the newly democratic state was unable 
to provide them with the protection they had been promised in the Bill of Rights. I 
Today South Africa is 'plagued by a crime wave that many see as a threat to the 
stability of [the 1 new democracy and a deterrent to international investment' (Carrier 
1999:5). While we know a great deal about the social conditions which are 
contributing to the high crime levels, there is a serious dearth of research into existing 
and potential policing practices. As a result it is not surprising that Ted Legget argues 
that not only does South Africa have a crime problem but that it has a policing 
problem (2005:168), and that Altbeker queries whether we have the tools to address it 
(2001 :3 9). 
It will be shown that the policing problem that currently plagues South Africa is not 
the result of a shortage of providers but rather a problem of co-coordinating security 
governance. As Shearing and Kempa (2000:205) observe, when governments have 
focused on democratizing policing they have focused on the reform of the state police. 
While the importance of such reform is indisputable it is inadequate in light of the fact 
that, as it will be shown, state policing initiatives are only one in a myriad of 
responses to crime and insecurity. 
In 2004 Baker wrote that there was 'a dearth of data and analysis concerning the 
nature of contemporary policing in Africa, the effect of fragmentation of policing on 
justice, accountability, and quality of service, and the actions of governments to 
control and hold accountable all forms of policing' (2004a: 183). This thesis is an 
attempt to engage with these problems on a local level. 
I Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law (Section 
9 (I) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Affica, Act 108 of 1996). 
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Although for academic purposes discussing policing in terms of a dichotomy between state 
and non-state policing may seem appealing, Baker points out that 'the dichotomising of 
public and private security oversimplifies what is in reality a complex world of overlapping 
and cooperative patterns of security' (2004:167; see also Dupont, Grabosky and Shearing, 
2003:333). It is increasingly apparent that the majority of academic literature which assumes 
this dichotomy between public and private or state and non-state policing (especially in 
South Africa) fails to see that not only do policing initiatives overlap, but that the 
relationships between the different nodes are often irregular and thus indistinct. As Irish 
asserts, ' the boundaries between public and private security are becoming increasingly 
blurred ' (Irish, 1999: 10). 
Policing needs to be understood, then, within a framework which recognises the existence of 
a variety of state, commercial, community groups and individuals which exist within loose 
and sometimes informal, sometimes formal , networks to provide for the security of citizens. 
The relationship of the state to these non-state security provision measures with regard to 
authority and control, moreover, is highly variable. Additionally, not only is the form that 
policing provision takes variable, but so is its perceived and actual function ranging from 
punishment for offenders to problem-solving to ri sk management to remedial or restorative 
approaches (Baker, 2004: 169). Thus, for the purposes of this study, policing is understood as 
'any organized activity that seeks to ensure the maintenance of communal order, security and 
peace through elements of prevention, deterrence, investigation of breaches and punishment' 
(Baker 2004: 165). As Ryan Carrier has stated, policing is no longer viewed as 'something 
that the police own' (Carrier, 1999: 2). 
The different forms and functions of non-state policing that transpire ll1 any given 
community are highly related to the context in which they emerge. Les Johnston (1992:71) 
suggests that we can distinguish at least three categories of non-state policing, namely: 
1. Autonomous citizen responses 
2. Responsible citizen responses 
3. The registered private security industry 
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Autonomous citizen responses 
According to Johnston (1992) autonomous citizen responses are 'reactions to crime and 
disorder, or to fear of crime and disorder [which 1 involve citizens in autonomous forms of 
self-policing: those which are undertaken, in the main, without the cooperation or 
involvement of public police organizations' (Johnston 1992: 159). The aforementioned 
reactions by individuals or groups of individuals are often referred to as 'vigilante activity.' 
According to Johnston (1996 in Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002: 11) six elements characterize 
vigilante activity. These are: 
I. Minimal planning, preparation or premeditation; 
2. Private agents acting in a voluntary capacity; 
3. Activity undertaken without the states authority and support; 
4. Force is either used or threatened; 
5. A reaction to the real or perceived transgression of institutionalized norms; 
6. Aims to offer people the assurance that established order will prevail. 
Johnston contends that modern vigilantism occurs as a result of two conditions. Firstly the 
belief within a community that crime and social disorder is a threat to public stability and 
secondly that the criminal justice system is contemporaneously unable to deal with the 
apparent crisis: either due to a dearth of resources, or as a result of inefficiency and the 
erroneous use of resources (1992: 159). As Baker says, such activity today is ' largely a 
response of frustration by citizens who regard the state police as being unable, through lack 
of resources and training, to provide security, or who in extreme cases actually collaborate 
with criminals' (2001 :4). 
Responsible citizen responses 
The privatization of policing functions does not necessarily preclude state involvement. 
Privatization of policing functions 'can also be brought about when private citizens take over 
some of the responsibility for public security from police organizations' (Johnston 
1992: 137). Responsible citizen approaches are can'ied out with the consent or support of the 
state police. The main objective of such approaches is to create partnerships between state 
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institutions and the public in order to combat crime in local areas. As a result, advocates of 
responsible citizen approaches invariably 'place considerable emphasis on the alleged virtues 
of community policing and multi-agency approaches to crime prevention' (Johnston 
1992:137). 
Private Security Industry 
The private security industry operates, for the most part, within the bounds of the law and 
ideally in cooperation with the state police. According to Johnston, (1992:71) the industry 
can be divided into three categories. 
1. Physical mechanical: i.e. the provision of locks, safes, strong rooms, grilles, shutters, 
security glass, anti-bandit screens, vehicle security etching, cash bags, boarding-up 
services, etc. 
2. Electrical/electronic: i.e. manufacturers, surveyors and installers of alarms, detectors, 
control panels, CCTV, signaling apparatus, video motion detection, access control 
and electronic locking systems, security cameras, cash handling aids (e.g. smoke and 
dye canisters), etc. 
3. Manned (and womanned) servIces: static or patrol guarding servIces, cash 
transportation (bank collection, wage packeting), key holding and responding to 
alarms, alarm monitoring, eeTV; and audio surveillance remote monitoring, etc. 
*** 
Research suggests that while reliance on both state and non-state policing appears inevitable 
and ubiquitous in the contemporary context, the blurred and complex mix of state and non-
state policing provision can raise serious questions from the point of view of new 
democracies (Baker, 2004; Irish 2000). South Africa' s democratic transition is one decade 
old and with the purported policing crisis in the country, democratic control over policing has 
become increasingly important. 
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Democratic Control of Policing 
South Africa's transition to democracy in 1994 lead to the establishment of many of the 
'institutions and mechanisms associated with a fully fledged liberal democracy' (Lodge, 
2002:153). An array of political parties emerged for which all South Africans over the age of 
majority were allowed to vote. A constitution and a Bill of Rights were drafted, guaranteeing 
South Africans freedoms. Commissions were established to protect these rights, and freedom 
of the press was not only permitted but encouraged to keep the newly elected government 
accountable. Although these achievements have been hailed as little short of miraculous, it 
would be imprudent to think that the transition was complete. As Tom Lodge (2002: 153) 
observes, democracies are not created overnight. 'Competitive and reasonably well managed 
elections as well as legally codified civil rights define a formal or electoral democracy but 
fairly elected governments and humane constitutions are insufficient to make a system 
effectively democratic' (Lodge, 2002: 153). 
Whether or not states meet the requirements for democracy, they all have some form of 
policing arrangement. The difference is that democratic states have official mechanisms in 
place designed to control the state police (and increasingly private policing initiatives) and to 
ensure that they remain just and accountable. This is extremely important because policing, 
by its very nature, holds the potential to threaten democracy. In their daily activities police 
personnel work to provide for the security of the state' s citizens, reducing crime, fear of 
crime and victimization by enforcing the law. The consequences of such a mandate result in 
a situation where many police endeavours take place in potentially challenging and often 
problematic circumstances, and with potentially dangerous and often difficult individuals 
(Skogan and Meares 2004:67). According to Skogan and Meares, because the police 'work 
outside the public eye, they routinely have opportunities to engage in a laundry list of corrupt 
activities ' (2004:66). It is not surprising that Rachel Neild (1999: I) argues that public 
security problems directly affect the stability of new democracies. As a result it is extremely 
important that policing is democratically controlled. Policing's compliance with the law is a 
central feature of democratic society (Skogan and Meares, 2004: 66). 
Jones, Newburn and Smith (1996) draw attention to the fact that although there is widespread 
agreement about the importance and desirability of democratic policing, there is equally 
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widespread 'disagreement about what exactly this would constitute ' (1996:6). Democracy is 
a complex concept despite the tendency to use the term as if its meaning were self evident 
(Jones, Newburn and Smith, 1996: 1). 
According to Jones, Newburn and Smith (1996) democratic theorists are divided in their 
understandings of what democracy entails. The first understanding of democracy, as the 
existence of a set of political institutions is resoundingly Schumpeterian. Schumpeter 
(1961 :269) defines democracy as ' that institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle 
for the people' s vote' (Schumpeter cited in Sorensen, 1993: 10). The second understanding 
of democracy is held by those who view democracy as a series of social ideals, and it is this 
understanding of democracy that will be utilized in the thesis. The argument maintains that 
instead of narrowly focusing on the institutions that purportedly signify the existence of 
democracy that 'a more helpful approach to examining the meaning of democracy is to 
analyze the range of values underpinning those institutions and processes ' (Jones, Newburn 
and Smith, 1996:4). South Africa's new constitutional order is widely acknowledged as being 
one of the most advanced and comprehensive in the world. As a result one could argue, in 
terms of Schumpeter's understandings of democracy, that South Africa's transition is 
'technically' complete. A perfunctory examination of the current state of South African 
policing indicates however that this is not the case. As a result, it is the contention of this 
thesis that an analysis of the values (or lack of values) underpinning South Africa' s 
'democratic ' institutions is vital. 
Democratic governance makes particular demands of policing, most specifically that the 
form that policing takes must be 'accountable, consistent and humane ' (Baker, 2002:30). As 
a result a number of criteria must be outlined (in this case in relation to policing) which can 
then be used both as a measure of current policing practices and as a guideline for conducting 
democratic policing. Here a useful schema is provided by the Law Commission of Canada 
(2002) which contends that four values and principles - justice, equality, accountability, and 
efficiency - should support policing in a democracy (The Law Commission of Canada report, 
2002:23). 
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Eguality 
Equality is the most important characteristic of democratic policing, because in 'principle all 
other elements derive from it' (Jones, Newburn and Smith, 1996:8). According to the Law 
Commission of Canada, two aspects of equality need to be present for policing to be said 
genuinely to respect the value of equality. Firstly there must be equality of service and 
secondly 'policing must be inclusive of all members of society' (The Law Commission of 
Canada report, 2002:23). These characteristics of equality can be encompassed within the 
notion of the fair distribution of police services, which entails distributing police resources 
and personnel fairly so that all members of society have equal access to equal levels of 
servIce. 
One of the reasons cited by various theorists for the growth in the private security industry is 
the fact that policing has failed to be implemented equally. If policing initiatives fail to 
safeguard each and every member of the communities that they represent, their 
accomplishments in terms of democratic policing become debateable. 
Accountability 
Accountability is vital to democratic policing. Accountability entails being held responsible 
for one's actions. In other words, for the policing to be accountable to the public it must be 
subject to review. It is the contention of numerous theorists (see for example; Stone and 
Ward, 2000; Bayley, 1997; Bruce & Neild, 2005) that remaining accountable to various 
structures at various levels is what distinguishes democratic policing bodies from their non-
democratic counterparts (Ward and Stone, 2000: 11). 
In accordance, the thesis argues that no individual mechanism of accountability is adequate. 
If it is to be deemed democratic, policing necessitates accountability mechanisms at three 
levels of control: 
I. State or governmental control (external) 
2. Internal or departmental control 
3. Social control or control by civil society 
(Ward and Stone, 2000: 11). 
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External Control 
According to Bruce and Nei ld (2005 :22), for policing to be accountable and transparent an 
autonomous and efficient supervisory apparatus must exist to guarantee that grievances 
against the police are investigated. 
Internal control 
The police agency must have an accessible and operational arrangement for receiving 
grievances and an efficient internal arrangement which ensures that all investigations against 
its members are carried out in an appropriate and prompt fashion (Bruce & Neild, 2005:38). 
Community level control 
Civilian oversight is increasingly accepted to be an important accountability mechanism 
particularly when, as Rachel Neild (1999) observes, the quality of internal accountability 
measures are somewhat dubious. Dixon (2000:77) refers to community level control 
measures as 'organic mechanisms.' According to Dixon this type of accountability is non-
institutional and 'depends on the intimacy that programmes of visible policing are intended 
to foster between police personnel on permanent assignment to small managerial areas ' 
(Dixon, 2000:77). According to the Pattern Commission,2 this type of accountability can be 
enhanced by allowing 'lay visitors' to inspect policing practices (Recommendations 64 and 
148 in the Report a/the independent Commission on policing/or Northern Ireland). 
There is no universally accepted method when it comes to establishing or reinforcing 
accountability. However, for genuine accountability to develop, it is vital that innovative 
ways of monitoring policing as it takes place, rather than after it takes place, must be 
investigated (Jones, Newburn and Smith, 1996: 12). 
Justice 
According to Rawls, the ' fundamental idea in the concept of justice, is fairness' (Rawls, 
1967: 132). As a result very few people would question the fact that justice is a crucial 
attribute of democracy. Due to their conviction that ' doing justice means that individuals 
ought to be treated fairly and that decisions about their lives should not be based on narrow 
2 Independent Comm ission on Policing for Northern Ireland 
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instrumental concerns but rather appeal to greater universal freedoms' (The Law 
Commission of Canada report, 2002:23), the Law Commission of Canada argue that policing 
must be carried out in such a way that both individual integrity and the peace of the 
community are guaranteed (The Law Commission of Canada report, 2002:23). 
Efficiency 
While efficiency or effectiveness is not itself part of the specific edifice of democratic 
policing, in other words it is not a prerequisite for democracy that policing be effective, it is 
an important value. Bruce and Neild (2005:31) remind us that democracy is ' not only "by" 
the people, but " for" the people.' Policing is an important service provided to reduce 'crime, 
disorder and fear and promote public safety' (ibid). Citizens around the world demand high 
levels of service from policing initiatives. As a result, in their attempts to provide "for" the 
people, police services must be cost effective and efficient (The Law Commission of Canada 
report, 2002:27). Among other factors this entails responding promptly to emergency calls 
(Bruce & Neild, 2005:61). It is important to note that attempts to create efficient policing 
practices must not work against the aforementioned values of justice and equality (The Law 
Commission of Canada report, 2002:27). 
The Law Commission of Canada, in a section titled ' Discussion Points,' queries whether in 
fact these four values are the only prerequisites for democratic policing and asks whether 
other principles should be reflected in democratic policing. I argue, like Diana Gordon 
(2001), that consolidation of democracy must move beyond procedural guarantees and 
adherence to the principles of democracy outlined above by including 'operational 
expectations that citizens will be able to influence government and exercise individual rights 
and that government will give citizens at least some of what they want' (Gordon, 2001: 125). 
Citizens' involvement in governance, the importance of which was previously discussed, 
depends on what Dhal (1971) tern1S the ' responsiveness' of government. He argues that 
' responsiveness ' necessitates that citizens are given opportunities to: 
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I. Formulate their preferences 
2. Signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the governments by individual 
and collective action 
3. Have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of government 
(Dhal in Sorensen, 1993: 12) 
*** 
Johnston and Shearing (2000), argue that understanding how any particular area is 'policed' 
involves empirical research into the web of initiatives in a locality which seek to guarantee 
that public order, security and peace are upheld. Research suggests that, what Bayley 
(200 I :36) refers to as 'cookie cutter attempts at reform,' do not work. As a result police 
reform 'cannot be left to police experts, but must involve area specialists, social scientists 
and historians' (Bayley, 2001 :36). Thus if one wants to improve how a particular area is 
policed, in terms of both effectiveness and democratic reform, one needs to understand how 
and why policing unfolds as it does in that specific locality. This thesis is a preliminary 
attempt to understand, shed light on and assess policing practices in Grahamstown. As 
Marenin observes, any effort to democratize policing 'requires a profound understanding of 
the practices, cultures and politics of policing' (2005: 111) in the locality in question. 
The research was conducted using primary and secondary qualitative methods. Prior to the 
commencement of primary research a detailed review of the wide available local and 
international literature on non-state policing and security governance was conducted. This 
research was followed by in-depth interviews with key informants - members of the SAPS 
and non-state policing initiatives - with the view to mapping and describing the varied 
mechanisms that citizens employ to secure themselves. 
Primary interviewees/informants, men and women who were 'particularly information-rich 
or enlightening' (Kelly, in Terre Blanche & Durrheim 1999: 382), were approached at the 
outset of the research process. These informants included the owners of the two local private 
security companies and two SAPS Captains. Additional informants were located by what can 
be described as a 'snowballing' process. In other words, the four primary informants pointed 
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to other useful informants who in turn pointed to further informants. The complete research 
process included discussions with: 
• Various members of the SAPS, including: 
3 SAPS inspectors (Inspector's X, Y, and Z) 
3 SAPS captains (Captain 's X, Y, and Z) 
1 senior superintendent. (Senior Superintendent X) 
• Members of a local Armed response Team (8 men were interviewed in total) 
• Local Farmers 
• Members of the community involved in street committees 
The interview technique was an informal one, modeled on a dialogue rather than a strict 
question and answer exchange, which enhanced the probability of accessing detailed 
descriptions and understandings of policing. Interviews were tape-recorded so as to retain 
more information than would have been possible by depending on memory alone. The data 
analysis involved 'identifying themes and developing concepts and propositions' (Taylor and 
Bogdan, 1998: 140). However, rather than happening at the end of the data collection process, 
analysis occurred throughout. 
This thesis is an attempt to engage with the problems of security governance Il1 
Grahamstown, a small city in South Africa's Eastern Cape province populated by 120 000 
and situated approximately 130 kilometres North of Port Elizabeth. By providing a detailed 
description and explanation of Grahamstown's dynamic security governance network, and 
assessing it from the standpoint of democracy, this thesis has several objectives. Firstly, it is 
an attempt to gain a deeper understanding of the prospects and problems for democratic 
policing in Grahamstown and by implication, in many respects, South Africa at large. 
Secondly this thesis aims to highlight some of the potential benefits - in terms of both 
effectiveness and the advancement of democracy - of formalizing the policing partnerships 
that already exist in an ad hoc manner, and finally to suggest how government needs to start 
thinking about reconfiguring the governance of security in South Africa if we are to succeed 
in meeting the twin challenges of combating an unacceptably high crime rate and inculcating 
democratic policing. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF POLICING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The post-independence African state's record of democratic policing has not been promising 
with public police widely perceived as indifferent, inept, inefficient and corrupt (see for 
example, Adu-Mireku, 2002; Chukwuma, 2000; Shaw 2002) or, for the poor, simply absent 
(see for example Pelsner, Louw and Ntuli 2000). 
Preceding South Africa's transition to democracy in 1994 state policing in South Africa 
could be described as rules-based. According to Duxita Mistry (1997:40) 'police behaviour, 
responsibilities and duties were determined by rules, regulations and hierarchies rather than 
initiative, discretion and consultation.' Due to the fact that the South African Police (SAP) 
was created to monitor and suppress South Africa's black population it conducted itself in a 
largely militaristic way. In 1948 with the formal implementation of the apartheid regime, the 
SAP became little more than the enforcement wing of a government intent on suppressing the 
majority of its population. As a result of this, policing, in the real sense of the word, 
deteriorated rapidly. 
Between 1948 and 1994, policing was plagued by a myriad of problems. In the first instance, 
it was incident driven, aimed at resolving contemporaneous situations rather than creating the 
conditions for preventing similar problems in the future. This inability effectively to deal 
with crime was accompanied by a lack of transparency and a persistent association with 
human rights abuses. These factors contributed to the SAP's acute lack of credibility by the 
1990s. As van der Spuy (2000) points out, by the 'time that the political transition to 
democracy began in 1990, the SAP had become totally committed to the fight against those 
organisations and people who were committed to ending apartheid . . .it was an inefficient and 
ineffective police force, which had lost the confidence of the South African Public ' (cited in 
Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 136). 
When the government of national unity assumed power in 1994 it was indisputable that the 
SAP had to undergo major reform if it was to play an effective, co-operative and accountable 
role in a democratic South Africa. South Africa's transformation resulted in the demise of 
the SAP and the emergence of the South African Police Service (SAPS). According to Ted 
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Leggett 'the transformation of the state's response to crime after the democratic election has 
been remarkable' (2005: 145). 'Taking what had been, essentially, an army of occupation and 
turning it into a democratic police service was no mean feat' (Leggett, 2005:156). 
From its inception the SAPS were charged with two connected but separate endeavours: to 
undergo reform (in other words to become a democratic police service) and to stay crime. 
According to Ted Leggett, ' police reform is about making the SAPS more effective, efficient 
and equitable as a democratic, law-enforcing body ... [while] ... crime prevention is about 
addressing the causes of crime via a wide range of interventions, many of which lie outside 
the expertise of the police' (Leggett, 2005: 145). As a consequence of this resolve the notion 
of 'community policing was introduced almost simultaneously with democratic rule in 1994' 
(Brogden and Nijhar, 2005: 138). Community policing is based on the conviction that by 
creating credible links with local communities policing has the potential to playa major 
political role in the country's democratic transformation. Community policing which, as 
Brogden and Nijhar (2005) point out, comes in all shapes and sizes is extremely difficult to 
define. 
Whatever the intent of local structures - from Police Community Forums 
to ad hoc campaigns like Crime Stoppers, from beat patrols to the 
optimism of Neighborhood Watch Schemes and to the specifics of sector 
policing, it appears to be most generally defined by its negative. It is not 
military-style policing with a central bureaucracy obedient to directive 
legislation which minimizes discretion. It is not policing that is 
autonomous of public consent and accountability. It is not policing that is 
committed primarily to reactive crime-fighting strategies. It is not policing 
that is measured by output in terms of professional efficiency. Rather it is 
policing which is determined by strategies, tactics and outcomes based on 
community consent. 
(Brogden and Nijhar, 2005: I) 
The first official step towards community policing, which was outlined in the country's 
Interim Constitution, was the establishment of 'Community Police Forums' (CPFs) at all the 
police stations. The South African Police Service Act of 1995 made' station commissioners 
responsible for convening CPFs in their precincts ... firstly to allow local communities an 
opportunity to express their priorities about crime interventions ... and secondly to become 
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active partners in crime prevention projects' (Scharf, Saban & Hauck, 2001: 66). However it 
soon became apparent that the successful establishment of Community Police Forums at 
most police stations across South Africa could not be used as a measure of community 
policing's success. It was almost immediately evident that not only was there little consensus 
regarding what the partnerships between the community police forums and the police were 
meant to achieve (see for example Brogden and Nijhar, 2005: 145), but that they had become 
little more than a medium through which South Africans could voice their complaints. By the 
close of the century a number of factors had contributed to the demise of community policing 
in South Africa. According to Scharf (2000) these include: 
• In many cases, apart from instructions as regards to the centrality of CPF meetings 
and the importance of responding to community requests there was little or no 
guidance offered to station commissioners relating to how to carry out community 
policing. 
• There was an inability to foster understanding of the ideology behind community 
policing amongst police officials. 
• The lack of training in community policing was a major problem. Community 
policing was ultimately little more than a public relations strategy due to the fact that 
only a small percentage of the SAPS were properly trained in community policing by 
the end of 1998. 
• The nature of South Africa's transformation was that of a negotiated settlement. This 
meant that all of the former SAP personnel were permitted to be part of the reformed 
SAPS. The SAPS was thus made up of a great deal of untrained and illiterate 
personnel from the homelands, and many disinterested and unmotivated personnel 
from the former SAP. 
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• The SAPS had initially understood community policing as a 'communications and 
liaison' strategy only. As a result, the only individuals who felt bound by the policy 
of community policing was the station commissioner and community policing officer. 
Most other SAPS branches continued to work with little concern for the notion of 
community policing. 
• In many instances the Community Police Forums only involved the police and local 
communities. In other words there was a failure to involve all of the necessary 
stakeholders. 
• Regular and meaningful state support was largely lacking. 
Community Police Forums were however only one of a host of other structures that were 
established to police the new South Africa. Anti-crime forums and anti-crime committees3 as 
well as residents' liaison committees, disciplinary committees, vigilantes and many other 
structures were established to deal with crime in South Africa post 1994. According to 
Scharf, Saban and Hauck (2001 :66) the post 1994 explosion of community initiatives against 
crime was so plentiful and diverse because the state was 'unable (some might say unwilling) 
to live up to peoples' expectations to protect them against criminals.' Many South Africans 
believed that with democratisation in 1994, would come a slow but steady decline in crime 
due to a gradual improvement in service delivery. In the first few years after South Africa' s 
transition to democracy, recorded crime arguably stabilized. However, post 1997 figures 
indicate that crime levels have increased by more than five per cent a year. Between 1994 
and 2000 violent crime increased by 34 per cent, property crime by 23 per cent, and 
commercial crime by nine per cent (Landman & Schonteich, 2002:75). Recent research also 
indicates a rising sense of insecurity among South Africans. According to surveys done by 
the Human Science Research Council (HSRC), the percentage of people who felt unsafe in 
South Africa rose from 16 per cent in 1994 to 45 per cent by 2000 (HSRC cited in Landman 
& Schonteich, 2002:75). 
3 An anti-crime committee is a campaign committee against crime but operating under the auspices of 
the civic. Its weapon against crime is education and training of residents (CICI Series No.1 December 
1993). 
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It cannot be denied that under the government of the first democratic president Nelson 
Mandela police reform was, to cite Leggett, (2005) 'remarkable.' However it had not been 
completed by the 1999 elections. Between 1998 and 2001, fear of perceived crime escalated 
as a result of a number of factors, most noticeably the spate of bomb attacks in the Western 
Cape, which had resulted in over 100 injuries by the close of 2000 (Mail and Guardian, 
09/09/2000) and the increase in farm attacks (Leggett, 2005). During 2000 there were 902 
separate attacks on South African farms and smallholdings involving 142 murders (Kane-
Berman, 2001:102). According to Leggett, these 'incidents changed the orientation of the 
government toward democratic policing and shifted the emphasis from reform (in the form of 
partnership and community policing previously discussed) to crime combating' (Leggett, 
2005:155). Mandela' s successor President Thabo Mbeki, then Minister of Safety and 
Security Steve Tshwete and National Police Commissioner Jackie Selebi adopted a ' get 
tough' approach to policing which 'had more in common with the practices of the apartheid 
era than the progressive talk of the early democracy' (Leggett, 2005 : \55). 
The operational strategy under which the SAPS are currently operating - the National Crime 
Combating Strategy (NCCS) - is somewhat distressing. Although this nine year plan to 
'reduce crime and reform local level policing' (Steinberg, 2004:22) is posited as an outshoot 
of the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), the NCCS in reality offers a radical 
departure from the earlier approach. The NCCS document was produced by the SAPS, and 
not made accessible to the public, which instantly raised concerns about the advancement of 
police reform and the promotion of a transparent and accountable police service. 
The NCCS is a two phase strategy. Phase 1, the stabilisation phase, ran from 2000 - 2003. It 
was implemented to 'emphasise the one form of policing the organisation knows it can do 
well [nationally co-ordinated, high density policing campaigns] ... in order to create the 
breathing space in which station level policing could be rebuilt' (Steinberg, 2005:23). The 
second phase, the normalisation phase, began in 2004 and is envisaged to run through to 
2009. 
The first phase was described as a 'multi-disciplinary approach' that focuses all of its 
resources on 'hot spot' areas where crime rates exceed what is deemed normal (National 
Treasury 2001 in Leggett, 2005: 161). The strategy is about controlling crime statistics 
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through 'resorting to traditional, albeit targeted, authoritarian policing' (Leggett, 2005:165). 
As Legget (ibid: 161) wrote: 
The police and military show up in force. They make themselves 
visible. They wake everyone up at three a.m. and search their sugar 
bowls, without specific probable cause. They arrest people who 
arouse SUsplclons if they cannot provide the appropriate 
identification documents or paperwork. They seize lots of 
undocumented people and guns as well as drugs and suspected stolen 
property. They add any incidental arrests to their statistics. They 
throw up roadblocks and cordon-and-search operations to 
accomplish the same things on the roads and the sidewalks. What 
year is this again? 
Apart from the more palpable democratic concerns such policing practices ralse, a 
moratorium was placed on crime statistics in June 2000. Although this was lifted with 
regards to general statistics by the end of 200 I 'station level statistics remain a state secret' 
(Leggett, 2005: 166). If the public is denied access to this vital information it certainly can not 
be argued that policing in South Africa is transparent and accountable. In fact, this 
'paternalistic' tack (Leggett 2005), based on the notion that what you do not know can not 
hurt you, is according to Leggett 'antithetical to democratic policing ' (Leggett, 2005: 166). 
Numerous bodies, from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the Open Democracy 
Advice Centre (Odac) to Independent Newspapers, condemn the moratorium on crime 
statistics and indicate their contention that such action is unconstitutional (Mail & Guardian 
Online: 06104/200 I). 
The second phase of the NCCS is according to Steinberg, 'at first glance any rate, a project to 
overcome the inherited weaknesses and rebuild grassroots policing' (Steinberg, 2004:23). 
Phase two is centred on the notion of sector policing.4 
Sector Policing has been described as a more practical form of community policing. It is 'an 
approach to policing whereby a service area is divided into smaller manageable geographical 
areas known as sectors' (SAPS Journal: Vol. 01 Issue 01, 2002:13). This more decentralised 
4 Because sector policing is now officially a state strategy, I argue that the responsible citizen responses 
(in the form ofstreetlneighborhood committees) class ified by Baker as types of non state policing, are 
now being absorbed by state policing initiatives. They can thus no longer be spoken of as categorically 
"non state" programmes. 
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approach to policing attempts to create a situation in which democratic policing is advanced 
through the community's increasingly active role. 
Sector policing comprises of the following four phases: 
Phase 1 
Phase 2 
Phase 3 
Phase 4 
The boundaries of the sector are determined 
A sector commander is appointed 
A sector profile is drawn up 
A Sector Crime Forum5 
(Annual Report of the SAPS Grahamstown: April 2002 - March 2003: 13) 
Once these four phases have been completed a final phase is entered into in which the Sector 
Crime Forum 'embarks on the necessary activities and holds monthly meetings' (Annual 
Report of the SAPS Grahamstown: April 2002 - March 2003: 13). 
According to Millicent Maroga (2004:4) sector policing, if successful, can be seen to result in 
a number of benefits, which include: 
• Improving the means of identifying 'hot spots' at local levels 
• More efficient use of policing resources according to a particular sectors needs 
• Improving the visibility of the SAPS 
• The division of precincts into smaller areas will allow for greater manageability, which 
will lead to more effective and efficient responses to the community 
• increased cooperation between the SAPS and local communities. 
Sector policing theoretically began in South Africa in 2004. But the commencement of this 
second phase has been far from uniform. Not only has its implementation been uneven across 
the country but it has been irregularly executed within policing districts. 
, A structure where the community and the local police discuss the safety and security needs of that 
sector. (Annual Report olthe SAPS Grahamstown: April 2002 - March 2003: 13) 
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The idea of sector policing was outlined in the Draft National Instruction on Sector Policing. 
However instead of this document shedding light on exactly how sector policing should 
unfold, it is somewhat vague and certainly open to interpretation. As Steinberg wrote: 
A station that interprets the Instruction leanly might for instance, hive off 
the sector commander and his or her work into a discrete, parallel sphere 
leaving the substance of everyday policing unchanged... [Whereas] 
... alternatively, a creative and generous interpretation of the Instruction 
could aim to instil a new philosophy throughout the station-level 
organisation, replete with substantive changes in day to day policing. 
(Steinberg, 2005:23) 
Questions of approach aside, an important failure of policing in the democratic era has been 
the unevenness of its application. The SAPS still falls short in its provision of a uniform 
service to citizens. While some South Africans feel that on average the SAPS are reliable 
others feel largely deserted. According to Pelsner, Louw and Ntuli, (2000) in the deep rural 
environment various factors act as constraints to effective policing so that only 22.9 percent 
of respondents in their study of crime and policing in South Africa's rural areas felt that the 
police were effectively dealing with crime. These include: geographic and topographic 
constraints as well as infrastructural and resource constraints. 
*** 
While state policing has unquestionably undergone enormous changes since the advent of 
democracy in 1994, so too has non-state policing. As a result of increasing crime and 
perceptions of insecurity amongst South Africans, along with actual and perceived 
inadequacies within the SAPS, citizens have made alternative arrangements for their security. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to contextualizing the emergence and evolution of 
non-state policing in South Africa. 
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Autonomous citizen responses 
Vigilantism is not a new phenomenon in South Africa. According to Sekhonyane & Louw, 
(2002) although vigilantism became more prominent in the eighties and nineties it was 
certainly not unknown earlier than that. During apartheid, vigilantes groups in the 
' homelands ' were created and supported by the government, both financially and with the 
provision of arms, in an attempt to deflect attention from growing political resistance to 
apartheid. During the 1980s vigilantism signified ' the violent, organized groups which, 
although they received no official recognition, acted to neutralize and destroy groupings 
opposed to the apartheid state and its institutions' (Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002: 2). As a form 
of resistance to these vigilante groups, black communities across South Africa set up 'street 
committees' as a means of alerting members of the community to potential attacks and thus 
offering a means of protection. In addition to the establishment of street committees, 
communities across South Africa established ' people's courts' (also known as kangaroo 
courts) to ' try alleged police informers, criminal elements within the liberation movement 
and common criminals' (Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002: 5). In the mid 1990s a new criminal, 
rather than politically focused, vigilantism began to appear throughout South Africa. 
According to Sekhonyane & Louw (2002), the reemergence of vigilantism, which was most 
noticeable in the Western Cape, the Eastern Cape and the Notihern Province, was most 
probably linked to dissatisfaction with post 1994 service delivery. 
In South Africa today vigilantism is unquestionably a serious concern for the government. 
Although the situation is almost impossible accurately to gauge, 'the largest and most recent 
survey conducted in 1999 in the Eastern Cape found that one in twenty people said they had 
personally been involved in vigilante activity and every fifth person said that they would 
consider becoming involved ' (Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002: I). The largest vigilante group in 
South Africa is presently ' Mapogo-a-matamaga. ' It was formed in 1996 in the Northern 
Province and is believed to have as many as 72 branches and over 70 000 members across 
the country (Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002: 17). People Against Gangsterism and Drugs, 
(PAGAD) is another example of a vigilante group which operates in South Africa. P AGAD 
was formed in 1994 when local residents' concern over gang murders in and around Cape 
Town escalated. Initially the group worked within the bounds of the law; however in 1996 
this peaceful attempt to counteract gang violence was superceded by a violent incarnation of 
PAGAD which, like Mapogo-a-matamaga, felt no obligation to the law and were content to 
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'mete out their own brand of "medicine" to the suspects to cure them of their bad ways' 
(Baker, 2001:4). Although the larger vigilante groups are well known, most examples of 
vigilantism are considerably smaller and less organised, as is the case in the Eastern Cape. A 
study conducted by Lars Buur in the Eastern Cape found that these groups often saw 
themselves 'as extensions of the formal justice system' and that they believed that South 
African president Thabo Mbeki liked them to ' take matters into their own hands' (The 
Sunday Independent, 2002/ 05/04). 
Responsible citizen responses 
Not all non-state responses to insecurity are violent however. In addition to autonomous 
citizen responses, Johnston refers to responsible citizen responses in which 'private citizens 
take over some of the responsibility for public security from police organizations ' (Johnston 
1992:137). These responses are often carried out with the consent or support of the SAPS and 
sometimes include partnerships with the state police. 
The failure of traditional community policing in South Africa has resulted in the recent 
introduction of sector policing, a 'more practical form of community policing' (SAPS 
Journal, Vol. 1 Issue I, 2002:13), which has lead to the creation of state sanctioned street 
committees and sector crime forums. Sector policing is defined by the SAPS as 'an approach 
to policing whereby a police station's service area is divided into smaller, manageable 
geographical areas known as sectors ' (Ibid: 13). Each sector is managed by an appointed 
police official who supervises the sector's crime prevention measures. With the help of the 
sector's 'street committees' and regular 'sector forum meetings ' the manager ensures that all 
of the stakeholders in the sector playa role in 'identifying the particular safety and security 
needs ofthe sector' (Ibid: 13). 
In addition to the varying roles played by state-sanctioned street committees, there are a 
number of other examples of responsible citizen approaches in South Africa. On a local 
scale, many of these initiatives have been successful. There is no shortage of stories about 
successful ' neighborhood watch' schemes. The example of the Boland town of Stell en bosch 
is one of the better known instances of responsible citizen action. In this scheme, residents 
established a non-profit company 'The Stellenbosch Watch' in 1997 and employed police 
reservists equipped to carry out armed patrols. The scheme is based on the long-standing 
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notion of the 'bobby-on-the-beat' and the reservists patrol the district night and day, with 
'several times more officers and cars on the street per shift than the local police have' (Mail 
and Guardian October 03, 2005). 
Farm watch schemes are another example. In the greater Ixopo area in K wa Zulu Natal, an 
area known for its political violence during the period prior to the 1994 elections, farm watch 
schemes are a reality. Constant stock theft, the threat ofland invasions and the murder of two 
farmers in 1999, led to the establishment of the Ixopo Farm Watch. Today, renamed the 
Ixopo Community Watch, 'the organization now operates in four policing districts ... has 
nine full time employees, a twenty-four hour operations room and an annual budget of some 
R750 000 largely derived from fees paid by farmers and local timber companies' (Internet 3). 
Car guard initiatives are a further ubiquitous example of non-state policing which has been 
placed under the ambit of responsible citizen responses by Baker. Car Guards, men and 
women who offer 'personal surveillance of parked cars for a voluntary contribution' (Baker, 
200 I :6) have emerged across South Africa. 
Private Security Industry 
Van Onselen (1976) contends that the origin of the private security industry in Africa dates 
back to the early days of the mining industry, where mine owners and managers attempted to 
'exercise total control over their compound migrant workforce' (Van Onselen in Baker, 
2004: 180). Although this certainly contributed to the industry 's emergence, many theorists 
are more inclined to argue that the development of South Africa's private security industry 
was more directly a result of apartheid's oppressive political culture. During apartheid the 
South Africa Police Force was more occupied with maintaining internal political stability 
than with policing as it is here within defined. In an attempt to offer the overextended police 
force some reprieve, the apartheid government encouraged the development of commercial 
security initiatives (see for example Baker 2001 , Irish 1999, Pillay 2000, 200 I). As Deputy 
Minister for Safety and Security, Joe Matthews said to a board meeting of the Security 
Officers Interim Board on the 18th April 2000: 
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We come from a historical situation where security was basically aimed at 
preventing the emancipation of black people. That is how people 
perceived security. That is how they looked at it. And a lot of people 
believed that the security industry was merely another arm of the security 
apparatus of the [previous] government. Now we have to remove those 
perceptions. 
(Cited in Pillay 2001: 3) 
In South Africa today, the private security industry is said to have expanded by 
approximately 30 percent each year over the last two decades. With over 200 000 security 
officers in South Africa it is not surprising that Jenny Irish (2000 : 21) argues that the 
majority of urban South Africans are far more likely to come into contact with private 
security guards than with SAPS officers. 'Uniformed and equipped to a similar or better 
standard than the state police' private security companies have rapidly assumed much of the 
'day to day policing of white suburbs of South African towns' (Baker 2004: 180). In addition 
to the impact of their expanding roles on the blurring of boundaries between state and non-
state policing, many of these groups offer protection 'beyond the bounds of duty' (Baker 
2002:34), in other words external to their client base, which contribute to the porous nature 
of these boarders. 
According to Martin Schonteich (1999:3-4) the growth of the private security industry, 
specifically in the field of policing and crime control, has occurred for a number of reasons: 
• Commercial security compames are more efficient than state law enforcement 
agencies because they can be more easily adapted to altering levels of consumer 
demand; 
• The public doubts the SAPS 's ability to protect them from crime; 
• The inability of the SAPS to develop into a visible presence has resulted in the failure 
to significantly deter criminal activity; 
• South Africa's urban areas have created a multifaceted market for security; 
• Commercial security companies fulfil those security needs that the SAPS cannot or 
will not provide; 
• The proliferation of 'mass private-public property,' from shopping centers to gated 
communities has created a number of security needs that the SAPS cannot provide. 
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Jenny Irish (1999:3) offers additional reasons for the industry's expansion : 
• The withdrawal of the SAPS from some of its functions; 
• The increasing insistence of insurance companies that clients make use of private 
security measures; 
• The reality that 'security breeds security.' 
Irish contends that even though state and non-state initiatives have different objectives and 
roles, the 'emergence of a strong armed response component within the private security 
industry has moved the industry one step closer to performing some of the roles traditionally 
performed by the police' (Irish, 1999: 10). 
The re-negotiation of the boundaries between state and society 
Although discussed separately above, it is widely acknowledged (see for example Baker, 
2002; Irish, 1999; Bayley, 1996; Buur and Jensen, 2004) that the dividing line between state 
and non-state policing in South Africa is increasingly blurred. According to Buur and Jensen, 
(2004:144) South Africa is witnessing the 're-negotiation of the boundaries between state and 
society [and] at these frontiers, zones of contestation rather than boundaries - the distinction 
between the state and what normally falls outside the state becomes blurred ' (Buur and 
Jensen, 2004:144). 
Other factors such as the substantial recruitment from one sector to another, contribute to the 
blurring of boundaries between state and non state policing6 The absence of clear 
demarcation in practice between different forms of policing makes the relationship between 
them complex and difficult to map. It is the contention of this thesis that establishing the 
problems and prospects that exist for democratic policing in any locality necessitates a 
comprehensive understanding of the way in which the security governance network operates. 
6 Each example of non-state policing previously discussed have, to varying degrees, recruited former state 
police or state security personnel. This has lead to a growing exchange of information about the crime patterns 
and policing techniques (Shaw cited in Baker 2002:33) 
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CHAPTER 3 
STATE POLICING IN GRAHAMSTOWN AND PROBLEMS OF 
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
This chapter discusses the space hypothetically occupied by 'state policing' in Grahamstown. 
I say hypothetically because research in Grahamstown indicates that while all of the 
categories of non-state policing outlined by Baker (and classified under Johnston's model) 
are indeed still evident, it has become increasingly obvious that to continue to talk about 
these practices under the categories outlined by the aforementioned theorists would be to 
grossly misrepresent the current security governance network. In other words, what was 
referred to in the previous chapter as the "blurring of boundaries" between state and non-state 
policing (Irish; Baker; Hills, 2000) has occurred to the extent that it appears that certain 
categories of non-state policing have vanished, or been subsumed by state policing 
initiatives . 
Although it has been more than ten years since the transition to a democratic society, 
Grahamstown is still highly divided in racial terms. Its occupants (from all walks of life) 
speak of the 'boundary' when referring to the roads that divide the wealthier (predominantly 
white) western suburbs from the poorer (predominantly black) eastern suburbs. Policemen, 
security guards and citizens evoke the standard apartheid system of racial classification, 
referring to the 'white area,' 'coloured area' and ' the black area.' 
Policing in Grahamstown has seen the SAPS muddle through a number of attempts to create 
effective public-private partnerships, from the Community Justice Structures envisaged in the 
early post-apartheid years (including Civic Committees and Anti-Crime Committees) to the 
more recent unsuccessful attempts to introduce local Community Police Forum meetings. 
Like most police stations in South Africa, Grahamstown station suffers severely from 
problems related to understaffing. Until recentl / this was exacerbated by the somewhat 
misguided and largely ineffective attempts to implement sector policing. 
7 August and September 2005 have seen major and positive changes in the management of policing in 
Grahamstown 
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The Grahamstown district was originally divided into 69 sectors; however by June 2005 only 
six of those sectors were established and functioning. The success of sector policing 
undeniably depends on members of the SAPS buying into the concept. However, it was 
apparent in Grahamstown that each and every member of the SAPS was not convinced by the 
notion of sector policing and its supposed benefits. One inspector indicated a preference for 
more traditional policing methods, stating that the push from higher ranks to work only on 
sectors was unrealistic. 
No! You can't just say Sector! Sector! Sector, but ignore what's going 
on in places like extension "z" where there's no sector. 
The lack of support for sector policing in Grahamstown was arguably more a result of the 
fact that the complete transformation from community to sector policing had not occurred 
than a reluctance to appreciate the benefits of sector policing. The concern was linked to the 
realization that focusing most of the resources on six established sectors while essentially 
ignoring those that had not been set up was undemocratic. 
If 2004 was purportedly the beginning of the normalization phase of the NCCS, centred on 
the notion of sector policing, then what of the 63 unestablished sectors in Grahamstown? The 
inconsistent implementation of sector policing had resulted in a situation where the large 
majority of Grahamstown's citizens were still hypothetically in the first stage of the NCCS. 
Phase 1, the stabilisation phase, was described above as consisting of 'nationally co-
ordinated, high density policing campaigns that focused managerial human and logistical 
resources on 'hot spot' areas where crime was disproportionately high' (National Treasury 
2001 in Leggett, 2005: 161). As was pointed out above, this approach to policing is about 
controlling crime by 'resorting to traditional, albeit targeted, authoritarian policing' (Leggett, 
2005:165). As a result of the fact that sector policing (before August 2005) had been 
implemented in an inconsistent fashion, Grahamstown was essentially being policed by two 
divergent mentalities - one motivated by reform and normalisation, the other by stabilisation 
and control. 
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This inconsistency had not eluded the SAPS. Late in 2005 sector policing has been 
completely implemented in Grahamstown. A combination of new stafF and pressure from 
the National Head Office has had an extremely positive impact on the Grahamstown Police 
Station Area. Senior Superintendent eX) has made an enormous impact - both in terms of the 
more equitable implementation of sector policing and in terms of morale. As one inspector 
said: 
It was fantastic gelling this person, he walked in from Cape Town 
and he said; "right sector policing is iI!" He started us working on 
the sector profiles ... and man ... ii's been a long time since I've 
worked with someone like that. 
In addition to the introduction of a new employee with fresh ideas, Grahamstown 
underwent a National Head Office inspection to ascertain why the full implementation of 
sector policing had not occurred. The SAPS National Head Office is according to inspector 
(x) the central office situated in Pretoria which manages the administration of resources, 
policies and regulations pertaining to all members of the SAPS in South Africa's nine 
provinces. The Head Office inspection brought with it a new and determined focus which 
has resulted in the dissolution of the original 69 sectors and the creation of a more realistic 
four sector model. 
We've taken the topside of the township as one sector, (Sector 1); the 
bOl/om side of the township as another sector,(Sector 2); the town 
and the whole coloured and while area as another sector, (Sector 3); 
and the farms as Sector 4. 
(Inspector x) 
This subdivision has resulted in a system designed to compensate for the problems of 
understaffing and the lack of vehicles. Grahamstown very often has too few police vans to 
patrol effectively. Each sector now has one vehicle which ideally works in that sector for the 
duration of the recently revised eight hour shift. 2005 saw a reduction in the length of shift 
times from 12 hours to the pre 1994 eight hour shi fts. The impact has unquestionably enhanced 
the quality of policing. 
8 Senior Superintendent (X) was transferred lTom Cape Town to head the Crime Prevention Unit in 
Grahamstown. 
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The SAPS and Democratic Control 
Although remarkable progress has been made in terms of the implementation of sector 
policing, a number of issues are still of concern and negatively affect Grahamstown's prospects 
for democratic policing. 
Sector 3 is substantially bigger than Sector 1 and 2 - as inspector (x) pointed out, it includes the 
'coloured area' and the whole 'white area.' Due to the fact that there are only eight people 
working per shift, there are only two people policing each sector. Where the sectors are smaller 
this is slightly more reasonable. However in a sector as big as Sector 3, effective and visible 
policing may prove exceptionally difficult. As Inspector (y) bemoaned ' we try to manage but 
it's difficult.' A number of inspectors stated that they would ideally need 40 policemen per 
shift, thus ten per sector to effectively police the sectors. This once again raises concerns about 
equality of access to similar levels of service. 
Another concern often bemoaned by the more senior officers in the Grahamstown SAPS is 
related to the high rates of absenteeism. When a police station area is as understaffed as 
Grahamstown, even one absentee per shift affects sector policing significantly. When this 
occurs, shifts have to be shuffled so as not to leave the town sectors empty or understaffed. 
Inspector (x) pointed out that in these instances, it is the farms in sector 4 which suffer: ' they 
are being crucified most of the time.' Again this raises serious concerns about equality of 
access to similar levels of service. 
One of the most important aspects of equality is the fair distribution of police services. It was 
stated in Chapter 1 that 'the police is a public service and all people should be able to get to a 
police station without having to travel too great a distance and without needing private 
transport, while police should be able to react to emergency situations within a reasonably 
short time' (Bruce & Neild, 2005:32). Sector policing is a "problem-solving" approach to 
policing, heralded for its ability to bring about just, accountable and transparent policing. The 
inequality of access to equal levels of service has resulted in a situation where the degree to 
which the sectors are policed democratically is variable. 
In Chapter 1 it was observed that upholding the principle of justice in democratic policing 
necessitates that policing is conducted in a manner that not only ensures the peace of the 
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community but that also protects the integrity and humanity of the individual (The Law 
Commission of Canada report, 2002:23). In other words policing must respect the individual 
rights enshrined in the Constitution in a fair and just manner. 
Some of the biggest concerns relating to sector policing emerged during an interview with 
the secretary of the phase (x) street committee,9 in extension (x). Although the sectors have 
been rearranged since the interviews, the findings that transpired during this process will not 
have changed significantly. All 6 sectors were described as having a committee that 
represents the sector at the Sector Police Forums (SPFs). For organisational purposes each 
sector was divided into phases, each of which had their own committee, made up of members 
from the different street committees. According to RI , there is a street committee on every 
street in extension (x). The street committees report to the four phase committees, and 
representatives of the four phase committees report to the sector committee. 
According to RI members of the community are for the most part pleased with the 
partnership they have developed with the SAPS. Citizens report a large array of concerns to 
the street committees from small scale domestic disputes to more serious crimes such as 
domestic abuse, robbery and rape. When an incident occurs citizens either call the police and 
then report the matter to the street committee or tell the street committee which then decides 
whether or not to contact the police. According to R I people are more inclined to report 
matters to the street committee because the committee is 'more sympathetic to them than the 
police are .. . they feel more comfortable with the committee.' R I also feels that the fact that 
the street committees give the residents feedback 'so they ' re not in the dark' has been an 
extremely positive consequence of sector policing. She believes it helps people to view the 
SAPS in a more positive light because their activities become more transparent. 
RI is extremely positive about the benefits of sector policing. She argues that in a time when 
criminals in South Africa seem to have more rights than citizens, it is refreshing to be able to 
work with the community and help other people. However RI is aware that there are 
problems - and as I will later illustrate there are also problems of which she is unaware. 
9 Hereafter referred to as R I 
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One issue that concerns RI is related to the monthly SPFs. The sector committee is supposed 
to meet with the SAPS on a regular monthly basis. RI expresses frustration at the fact that 
these meetings are often postponed. She argues that although the SAPS attends regularly, that 
the municipality, which is also expected to be involved in SPF meetings, disappoints them 
repeatedly. 
We set a meeting and then on the night, when we're together, then they won't 
turn up. Then we contact them and ask why didn 'tthey attend the meeting and 
they say oh they went to another meeting, they never apologize. 
According to RI the street committees 'find the perpetrators ' and detain them until the 
police get there. RI does however admit that the street committees do not always call the 
police. In some instances they set up 'meetings ' with the perpetrators and 'explain to them 
that what they did was wrong.' When probed on this RI admitted that sometimes the older 
male members of the committees ' teach the perpetrators a lesson ' which has resulted in 
some members of the community becoming ' quite scared of the committees.' RI 
elaborated that the older men ' beat' the perpetrators or ' give them a hiding' but that this 
usually only occurs when the perpetrators are ' starting to get violent.' If the 'meeting' was 
dealing with a criminal matter, the street committee would then call the SAPS. 
The South African constitution was established to guarantee and protect the rights of South 
African citizens. This type of policing could exacerbate inequality. Liberal democracy 
among other things provides for '(I) an equal right of access to the legal process; and (2) an 
equal right to just adjudication of the law' (Baker 200 I: I 0). For private citizens or even for 
a policeman to 'teach a lesson' to a suspect is not only a violation of individuals' right of 
access to court, to a fair trial, to be regarded as innocent until proven guilty, to due process 
and equality but also of their personal right to human dignity . This type of 'community 
justice' or ' informal delict lO , (Steinberg, 2004) is undemocratic and therefore unlawful. 
The rule of law with its accompanying requirements of due process, fairness and 
predictability is a core requirement of democracy. 
The SAPS are aware such practices but claim to be powerless to take the initiative in 
combating them: 
10 This is an informal system of restorative justice, in which the complainant's family informally sues 
the perpetrators family for damages. (Steinberg, 2004: 61 & 42) 
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We 've heard of this ... but we depend on someone reporting it. 1 don't 
mean we don't want to pay attention to it.. . 1 don 't mean we don 't 
consider it to be a serious thing ... but we are dependent on that type of 
thing being reported. To take action we need a complainant! The bottom 
line is, you're the suspect, you got beaten up, if you 're not willing to put 
in a statement for me to prosecute the people who beat you up then my 
hands are tied. 
(Inspector x) 
While acknowledging that policing that unfolds in this fashion is extremely problematic and 
undermines Grahamstown's prospects for democratic policing, the SAPS seem unsure how 
best to address the problem. In the past they have conducted reports, held public meetings, 
and tried to educate the pUblic. However these attempts have had little effect. As inspector 
(x) pointed out, until one of these cases goes to court and a precedent which says kangaroo 
courts will get you into trouble is set, their efforts will remain ineffectual. 
The concern is that sector policing may have the potential to strengthen old practices of 
informal justice. In Steinberg's discussion of informal delict on the West Rand he argues that 
one possible (although unintended) consequence of sector policing 'is that it will begin to 
strengthen pre-existing cultures of informal delict' (2004 : 42). Inspector (x) felt 
understandably concerned about this. As Inspector (x) points out, this is precisely the 
opposite of sector policing's hoped for consequences. 
The whole idea I suppose would be that sector policing should stop it from 
happening since there's more visibility of the police ... and the police can take 
better action. Sector policing is here to make people feel more safe ... its 
supposed to make people feel we're effective ... and if we're still seen as 
ineffective because they can still take the law into their own hands then what 
sort of relationship do we actually have? 
Alice Hills points out that 'community policing is often understood as policing by the 
community rather than a joint venture between the people and the police ' (Hills, 2000:171). 
She argues that not only is this understanding of community policing narrow, but it masks the 
fact that the bulk of the authority should remain with the police ' because community policing 
is not self-help policing' (Hills, 2000: I 7 I). 
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In addition to the problems these types of ' community justice ' or ' informal delict' create for 
democracy, it is clear that the SAPS itself is not immune to charges of rough justice. At a 
recent meeting between the SAPS and some 800 township residents (23 September 200S) 
amongst the complaints lodged by residents were police brutality, xenophobia and abuse of 
ordinary citizens (Speckman, 200S:3). The Minister of Safety and Security Charles Nqakula 
who attended the meeting made clear national government's position: 'you do not protect our 
freedom if you do not...protect others . .. I don't want officers like that in the force. The 
president does not want them in the force. Citizens do not want them in the force' (Nqakula 
cited in Speckman, 200S:3) . While complaints continue to be lodged in Grahamstown 
relating to the abuse of ordinary citizens policing cannot be said to uphold the principle of 
justice which entai ls conducting policing in a manner that protects the integrity and humanity 
of the individual (The Law Commission of Canada report, 2002:23). 
A third major requirement of democratic policing is accountability. Accountability as was 
argued in Chapter I, is multiple and operates on at least three levels: departmental control, 
(internal) governmental control (external) and social control (Ward and Stone, 2000: II) . For 
policing to be accountable and transparent an ' independent and effective oversight 
mechanism' must exist 'to ensure that complaints against the police are investigated' (Bruce 
and Neild, 2005 :22). 
In terms of internal accountability, the only real mechanism in place is station level 
regulation. The SAPS policy on the lodging of internal complaints by civilians is contained 
in Standing Order 101. Standing Order 101 'obligates members to register complaints 
immediately in the Occurrence Book and to issue a reference number to the complainant' 
(Masuku, 2004:8). In addition, the standing order obliges the officer responsible for 
investigating disciplinary matters to 'immediately investigate any reported civilian complaint 
and report the results to the relevant Area level office' (ibid). Although in an early interview 
Inspector (x) referred to internal regulation as ' strict' it soon became apparent that 'strict 
regulation' has not been a constant characteristic of the Grahamstown SAPS. 
Each police station has one person responsible for investigating disciplinary matters and then 
reporting them to the area officer. The quality of internal regulation is thus dependent on the 
diligence and reliability of the officer responsible for investigating disciplinary matters. The 
last person to hold this position in Grahamstown was described by Inspector (x) as 
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incompetent and lazy. According to the aforementioned inspector, things that should have 
been considered serious offences were not dealt with and ended up being dated so that formal 
charges could never be laid. While it is commendable that internal mechanisms are in place, 
there should certainly be a system where the 'evaluators' are evaluated. Although Inspector 
(x) indicated that this was teclmically supposed to occur, she revealed that those who were 
supposed to be involved had not taken any interest. While incompetent work, (especially by 
someone holding this position) is accepted, genuine regulation and accountability will not 
emerge. 
An incident reported in the Dispatch Online (2004/07/21) raises another worrying matter. In 
July 2004 Captain George Green, assistant to the Grahamstown area commissioner, was 
beaten up at the Alicedale station. While conducting a routine check to ensure that the 
officers on duty were conducting their duties in a proper manner, Green was assaulted by a 
constable whom he 'challenged to explain his absence of 30 minutes' (Dispatch Online: 
Ibid). While a culture exists that prolongs the apartheid mentality that police officers do not 
have the right to hold fellow employees accountable, genuine police reform will not occur. 
In terms of external accountability, the SAPS are monitored by a number of bodies. These 
include: the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), the Directorate of Special 
Operations (DSO) commonly known as the Scorpions, and research organisations such as the 
Institute for Security Studies. The widely respected ICD in South Africa produces an annual 
report which provides statistical information on the number of deaths as a result of police 
action, as well as reports on various complaints lodged by members of the public (Bruce & 
Neild, 2005: 13). However there are a number of concerns. 
The ICD is said to place strong emphasis on its own investigative capacity and to take 
responsibility for independently investigating many of the cases which it receives' (Bruce & 
Neild, 2005 :26). But as Baker (2002) points out the ICD is not always able to conduct its 
own investigations. Inspector (x) confirmed this: 
We investigate to a certain point and then forward it [the docket} to 
them ... they have an investigator who comes and re-interviews people 
to make sure everything is covered ... So they do have an investigating 
capacity but they normally work off our docket first ... 
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In many cases the ICD has to 'rely on the police, which is hardly an effective way of publicly 
monitoring the police ' (Baker 2002:34). 
The Scorpions, which came into legal existence in January 200 I, were established to 'gather 
intelligence relating to specified offences ' (Nedbank ISS Crime Index: 2000) including 
organized crime and corruption. In terms of the Scorpions problems of accountability may be 
increasingly dire. During the process of writing this thesis Judge Sisi Khampepe has been 
charged with the task of investigating whether the Scorpions should remain with the National 
Prosecuting Authority or be bought under the ambit of the SAPS (sabcnews. com: 23 
September 2005). According to Minister of Safety and Security Charles Nqakula ' the African 
National Congress is considering forming a single police force under one command' (Mail & 
Guardian: 23 September 2005). The Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (Popcru) 
welcome this merge, however there are a number of problems with such a decision. Foremost 
is the fact that a single police force under one command reduces the structures to which the 
SAPS are accountable. As David Bruce (2005) points out, 'internationally it is recognized 
that police tackling organized crime are highly vulnerable to corruption by powerful crime 
syndicates [as a result] it is a good thing that we have both the SAPS and the Scorpions each 
investigating crime on their own initiative.' 
Sector policing must be credited for creating a third level of accountability, defined by 
Bayley (1996) as 'bottom-up' accountability. The emergence of this form of social 
accountability is a commendable advancement in the effort to create genuine accountability 
at multiple levels as described by Ward and Stone (2000). RI discussed a number of issues 
that she believes stand in the way of effective police reform. One of her biggest concerns is 
related to officers drinking on duty. She, like many other informants in town, II has had the 
displeasure of having to deal with members of the SAPS who were intoxicated on duty. The 
day after one specifically frustrating incident, Rl and the chairman of the Phase X street 
committee went to the police station and called the inspector who manages personnel. They 
explained the situation and laid a complaint and their report lead to a disciplinary hearing. 
Not only was Rl pleased by the p'ersonnel inspector's anger at the situation, but was grateful 
that unruly members of the SAPS were being held accountable for their actions. Rl admits 
II Various members of the private security companies as well as a few members of the public have 
relayed similar concerns. 
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that the situation has subsequently improved greatly. This episode illustrates the dual 
function of these committees. Not only are theses bodies established to help the SAPS police 
their communities but also to police the SAPS, ensuring they remain just, accountable and 
transparent. 
However, in terms of social control, my research suggests that this has not developed evenly 
in Grahamstown. While Sector I, the only sector running properly prior to the full 
implementation of sector policing in Grahamstown, may have the cooperation and support of 
the community, other sectors, specifically sector 3 and 4 have not achieved this. In fact , 
except for the implementation of sector policing on paper and the theoretical completion of 
phase 1 - 4 of the sector policing process, sector policing in sectors 3 and 4 remains largely 
unheard of by the majority of citizens. While citizens remain unaware of the vital role that 
they are now expected to play in keeping the Grahamstown policing bodies accountable on a 
daily basis, genuine accountability at multiple local levels will remain an illusion. 
A fourth feature that is central to any evaluation of the democratic quality of policing is 
efficiency. One of the many concerns raised by Grahamstown's residents is in relation to the 
inefficiency of policing in town. In many senses it is quite meaningless for a service to be 
highly accountable and equal if it is not efficient. In Chapter 1 it was stated that one of the 
requirements of an efficient and democratic police service was the prompt response to 
emergency calls (Bruce & Neild, 2005). When residents query why calls for assistance are 
often met with the excuse that 'police were short of vans or there were no police to attend the 
complaint' (Speckman, 2005) little explanation can be given. However the SAPS argue that 
the introduction of sector policing will 'ensure faster reaction to calls' (Ibid). 
Although the implementation of sector policing illustrates that the Grahamstown SAPS is 
attempting to distribute their resources and personnel as effectively as possible, and thus 
attempting to provide a fair distribution of police services, the discrepancies that still exist 
with regard to the provision of security in Grahamstown illustrate that current measures are 
not adequate. Many of the roads in Grahamstown East are still unmapped. This makes 
locating certain streets exceptionally difficult. This is compounded by the fact that many 
streets remained unnamed and the numbering of houses follows no systematic ordering. 
Driving around some areas in Grahamstown East one will see a house numbered 1489 (x) 
Street, next to a house numbered 2 (x) Street. In addition, the appalling condition of a large 
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majority of the roads makes response times poor. These problems are indicative of a 
desperate need for local government to get involved in Grahamstown's security governance 
network. 
Two 'government white papers published in 1998 on local government, and on Safety and 
Security, stress that local government should take on a stronger role in crime prevention and 
development' (Scharf, Saban and Hauck, 2001 :83). As Scharf et al (2001) argues, local 
government 'should be the level of government that convenes the partnerships to tackle 
crime and development issues in the area of its jurisdiction' (Scharf, Saban and Hauck, 
200 I :83). The lack of genuine local government support in Graharnstown is of serious 
concern especially in light of the fact that state support was cited by Scarf (2000) as one of 
the factors that lead to the demise of community policing. The lack of local government 
support is seriously hampering the SAPS's efficiency in a number of ways. 
Firstly the council's aforementioned failure to regularly attend SPFs wastes the time of those 
SAPS personnel in attendance. Secondly cost cutting by the municipality, specifically the 
decision to use ' the same set of locks for the front doors of several houses' in Extension 9 
(Grocotls Mail: 1 July 2005) has exacerbated break-ins in the area, thus making more work 
for an already overworked police service. Finally the aforementioned inability to respond 
promptly to emergency calls (Bruce & Neild, 2005:61). As Captain (x) bemoaned: 
The poor people don't have the type of infrastructure ... some of them don't 
have street addresses, street numbers and so forth, when the police is called 
out, or the security company gets to that area, it takes much longer because 
you've got to try and search for them. 
As a result of the municipality's failure to deal with the poor quality of the roads as well as 
their continued failure to map the large areas of Grahamstown East that remain uncharted 
policing these areas remains inefficient and thus undemocratic. 
Although the SAPS have come a long way, and the transformation that has occurred is 
nothing less than miraculous, there is still a long way to go. As Leggett (2005) points out, 
much of the transformation is a result of the 'persistence of democratic rhetoric' which has 
changed the mindset of the service. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NON-STATE POLICING IN GRAHAMSTOWN AND PROBLEMS OF 
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
As Landman & Schonteich (2002:71) have argued 'one of the consequences of the state's 
inability to protect the life and property of its citizens - especially in developing countries -
is the formation of private alternatives to crime prevention and control.' Various forms of 
non-state policing have emerged as a result of the different circumstances in which citizens 
find themselves. Following Les Johnston's three categories of non-state policing namely: 
autonomous citizen responses, responsible citizen responses and the registered private 
security industry (Johnston 1992:71) this chapter will show that like state policing, non-state 
policing is a highly variable practice and that understanding how it unfolds is essential to 
understanding the prospects and problems for democratic policing in Grahamstown. 
Non-state policing in Grahamstown has proven itself to be anything but static. Over the last 
five years alone, large shifts have occurred in the city's security governance network. My 
research indicates that the spatial patterns of non-state policing are increasingly unclear. Not 
only are the spatial boundaries demarcating the different types of non-state policing blurring 
but the border between state and non-state policing is in many ways a porous one. Moreover 
the distinction between different types of non-state policing is far from clear. Policing (in all of 
its forms) needs to be understood in fluid ways if one is to fully comprehend the nature, the 
prospects and the problems for democracy in the contemporary security governance network. 
Commercial non-state 
If there is one form of non-state policing in Grahamstown that is obvious, it is the private 
security industry. Not only has the private security industry expanded greatly in the last five 
years, but it has also, as I will later show, absorbed some of the other forms of non-state 
policing that previously existed. 
38 
Grahamstown's private security industry currently consists of two companies, HiTec Security 
which presently dominates the industry, and the newly established Ukhozi Lentaba Security. 
HiTec Security is one of the many examples in South Africa of security companies being 
established by former police officers. The profitable security company was founded 12 years 
ago by two men, one of whom was formerly a member of the SAP. 
HiTec Security is divided into two divisions, HiTec & Makana, which can be classified in 
terms of Johnston's second and third categories namely - electrical/electronic and manned 
(and womanned) services. HiTec's core business is electronic security specifically the 
installation and monitoring of alarm and panic systems. The firm currently monitors 2800 
alarms in Grahamstown. The armed response team carries tear gas, handcuffs and guns, for 
which the company holds company gun licenses. Although HiTec predominantly services 
the wealthier suburbs of Grahamstown West, they do provide security to over 100 houses in 
Grahamstown East as well as to schools and businesses. Secondary to HiTec is the guarding 
division, Makana, which is run as a separate entity. Makana provides physical security 
guards to predominately commercial applications such as shops, hospitals factories and so 
forth. There are 210 standing guards in total. 
The relationship between HiTec and the SAPS is an increasingly complex one. Where co-
operation between the two forms of policing has been established, it is in an ad hoc 
manner. In other words it has occurred without the official recognition of the SAPS 
management. Employees at HiTec Security admit that they are aware of the related 
problems of crime, policing and justice in Grahamstown . 
• 
1 take them to get locked up and the next day if they're back on the 
street then 1 just do it all over again and I'll just keep doing it. It gets 
irritating because they break in, you catch them, you lock them up and 
next morning they're on the street again. So what ... that time you 
didn't get it right, next time you try again 
(Member of the Armed Response Team) 
Extensive time spent with the armed response team indicates that they are anxious to 
strengthen their informal relationship with the SAPS. Moreover, residents often describe 
HiTec's willingness to go beyond the 'call of duty:' 
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If we see smoke in the location we go and help people to hose their 
houses down ... stuff like that .... someone has to do it ... 
(Member of the Armed Response Team) 
There by KFC I caught 2 guys with bags oj dagga. I thought they'd 
broke in cause they got new shoes on but old clothes and also decent big 
bags ... whenever I drove past they put them down ... every time ... and I 
drove past like Jour times and the fifth time I stopped and the guys 
dropped the bags and started walking away .. .1 thought no they broke in 
somewhere so I looked and they'd got dagga stacks ... they'd come Fom 
Pedi with R40 000 worth oj dagga. And then I caught the two guys and 
came back and called the police. 
(Member of the Armed Response Team) 
The armed response team not only responds (in emergencies) to calls from members of the 
public who are not clients, but repeatedly assist the increasing number of Grahamstown's 
citizens who are being mugged on the streets. Extensive observation revealed that HiTec 
acted as a visible and active deterrent in the Grahamstown West area (SAPS Sector 3) 
where the majority of their clients reside. As one of the co-owners explained: 
People have often commented on that [the Jact that HiTec acts as a 
deterrent] and our signs ... putting a sign on a house definitely acts as a 
deterrent ... ya ... people have often wanted to buy our signs to put up as a 
preventative measure. 
By ' going beyond the call of duty' HiTec cannot be defined solely in terms of its formal 
functions. 
Another example is related to the movement of suspected criminals. By law security guards 
are not entitled to move suspects. HiTec members are thus expected to wait with a suspect at 
the place of arrest until a member of the SAPS is able to attend to their call. However, this is 
neither feasible for HiTec Security nor for the understaffed Grahamstown Police Station. As 
one armed response guard explained: 
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They're too busy to come ... all the vans are busy .. . normally now if they 
can't come to us we come to then. We're not actually allowed to transfer 
people ... we have to catch them and keep them there till the police 
come ... but you can wait up to your whole shift and the police will never 
come. Sometimes there's like only one man working and sometimes they 
have like forty cases they have to attend to ... and you can't lurk here 
and wait for hours for them to come. That 's why we bring them here [to 
the police station. 
(Member of the Armed Response Team) 
What has thus emerged is an ad hoc agreement in which policing has been allowed to evolve 
in a fluid less structured way. Although effective arrangement is confirmed by both members 
of the SAPS and HiTec, it remains an initiative which has materialized without the official 
recognition of the SAPS management. The result is that it is impossible effectively to 
capitalize on this partnership and the potential for genuinely efficient policing is 
compromised. 
One example of this is that HiTec's crime patterns are not being taken into account when the 
SAPS Crime Prevention Unit calculates their 'hot spot' areas. Extensive observation of both 
the SAPS and HiTec indicated that when HiTec was focusing on one particular area due to an 
increase in break-ins, the SAPS was focusing its attention on a completely different 
neighbourhood. Although this problem could be eliminated if citizens realised it was their 
civic duty to properly report crime,12 it could also be dealt with by HiTec keeping a proper 
register of the break-ins they attended and officially reporting these figures to the SAPS. At 
one stage inspector (x) did have an informal arrangement with HiTec - HiTec would fax the 
inspector details of the crime patterns they had observed on a weekly basis - however this has 
fallen away. While this situation continues, effective policing is going to prove extremely 
difficult. 
Grahamstown's second commercial security outfit is Ukhozi Lentaba. Ukhozi Lentaba, which 
means ' the eagle of the mountain' was officially launched on July 1, 2005. Although it hopes 
to one day create 'healthy competition' in the industry, it currently only offers physical 
guarding, with a mere 10 guards on payroll . At present, the co-director claims to have little or 
12 Due to a variety offactors many of Grahamstown's residents choose not to open cases when they 
have been the victims of crime. Instead they report the incidents to the SAPS purely for insurance 
purposes. Although the SAPS then record this information in a register it is not included when crime 
paltems are calculated. 
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no relationship with either the SAPS or HiTec although he is not averse to forging closer ties 
with the aforementioned bodies in the future. The co-directors are hoping to expand the 
company in the forthcoming months. Within a few years they hope to not only have moved 
into electronic security but to have extended their services to other Eastern Cape Towns. 
It has been argued that democratic policing entails ensuring that policing remains accountable 
so that it serves the interests of the people (Bayley, 1996:7). The commercial private security 
industry claims that it does not pose a threat to democracy due to the fact that it is accountable 
to the market. Thus if clients find the conduct of their security company objectionable they can 
fire them. However it is highly likely that citizens in a crime ridden area will prioritize 
'effectiveness' over humane treatment of suspects, observance of human rights and rule of law 
considerations. Unfortunately what seems to proliferate is a tendency to muddle the 
'responsiveness' of private security to customers' needs with genuine accountability. Public 
accountability is not simply answerability to a (linked) client base. 
In a report titled 'Policing to Protect Human Rights,' Amnesty International cite poorly 
regulated private security services as one of a number of trends which are 'inimical to the 
development of publicly accountable law enforcement' (Amnesty International 2002:8). Many 
South African private industries require regulation. However, unlike the numerous industries 
which are able to practice self-regulation, (for example estate agents) many theorists have 
maintained that the private security industry requires a qualitatively different regulatory 
framework (See for example Irish, 1999; Bayley, 1996). This becomes increasingly imperative 
as the boundaries between state and non-state policing gradually blur. 
According to Visser (I 999: 12) cited in a Security Officers Interim Board l3 Policy 
Paper: 
Regulation generally means that the important aspects of the nature 
and activities of the security industry, including who is admitted to the 
industry and the standard of conduct expected of members of the 
industry, are controlled and shaped through enforcement strategies and 
actions in accordance with values, principles and standards contained 
in the applicable regulation. 
IJ The forerunner to the Private Security Regulatory Authority. 
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Regulation thus entails guaranteeing that the industry 's role-players do not consider their 
own subjective views, or that of their particular client on the j ust application of South African 
law as an adequate guide to their conduct. 
According to Irish (1999: 16) the regulation of private security can follow one of three 
models: 
• Non-interventionist: The state does not take responsibility for 
regulating the Industry. It is left to the market to ensure adequate 
regulation occurs. 
• Minimal regulation: The state introduces minimal legislation to 
regulate the people who work in the industry. Such regulation may also 
set limited rules and standards for the industry. 
• Comprehensive regulation: the state extends regulation beyond 
controlling the type of person who enters the industry. Substantive 
regulation is introduced to raise the standard and quality of services 
provided by the private security industry. 
In 1999 Irish characterized South Africa as having created a balance between the non-
interventionist and the minimal intervention model to ensure regulation occurs while giving 
representatives of the industry the responsibility for enforcing those regulations (Irish 
1999: 17). However the establishment of the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 
(PSIRA) in 2002 has attempted to move South Africa into a new epoch in terms of 
regulation. 
PSIRA was established to regulate the private security industry. The authority came into 
existence as a result of the Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 200 I which came 
into force on the 14th of February 2002. The 'primary objects of PSIRA are to regulate the 
private security industry in the public and national interest and the interest of the private 
security industry itself (Section 51 Manual for PSIRA: I). 
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PSIRA can be said to 'police' the industry. Once a month they inspect the companies and 
ascertain that all of the staff have done their training and have got the relevant certificates. 14 
Everybody who works in the private security industry in South Africa, from guards to 
receptionists, has to be fingerprinted to ascertain that they do not have criminal records and 
must then become members of the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority. As a 
result of this it can be argued that in terms of Irish's three models of regulation, South Africa 
now sits firmly in the realm of minimal regulation. 
While PSIRA is argued to be an effective regulatory mechanism it is not exempt from 
administrative problems. The co-owner of HiTec points out that there are flaws to the system, 
especially in terms of criminal clearance. For years the Campus Security division of the local 
university, Rhodes recruited staff from within the ranks of HiTec under the assumption that 
HiTec's employees - having been cleared by PSIRA or its predecessor the Security Officers 
Interim Board (SOB) - were free of criminal records. However when Rhodes University's 
Campus Security division decided to re-fingerprint their staff, it emerged that many of the 
individuals who had been cleared by the SOB did in fact have outstanding criminal records. 
As a result problems with regards to regulation, and thus genuine accountability, 
unquestionably persist. 
The exceptional service offered by commercial private initiatives in Grahamstown has led to 
many other forms of non-state policing, particularly those usually categorized as 'responsible 
citizen responses' being subsumed by private commercial initiatives. The most obvious 
example is the replacement of Car Guards - cited in Baker's (2002) study of Grahamstown 
as the best illustration of responsible citizen responses in the city - with what is referred to as 
the Diversified Parking System (OPS). In January 2003, Gauteng based company, 
Diversified Parking Systems and the Makana municipality 15 entered into a five year contract. 
The agreement was that the 'old parking meter system [would] be replaced with trained 
security guards 16 armed with computerized hand-sets. The sets [would] then be linked to the 
company's own central control centre, the local traffic department and the SAPS' (Greyling 
14 Private security guards have to qualifY within a grading system which runs trom grade E to A, E 
being the most basic entry level security work such as standing guards through to grade B and A for 
managers and owners of the companies. 
" A fact that made deciding whether to place this under state or non state policing somewhat difficult, 
and again an illustration of the blurring of state and non-state policing. 
16 According to Inspector x, each guard should technically hold a Grade E security qualification. 
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2003). Whereas in the past citizens paid a standard parking meter and had the option of 
making a voluntary contribution to the car guard, now the two systems are combined so that 
the car guards also act as mobile parking meters. This system is unquestionably a partnership 
between the state and a private company and can thus no longer be categorized as a 
responsible citizen response but rather as a semi-official commercial form of policing/service 
delivery. 
Although there was some protest by existing car guards as a result of job losses, the DPS has 
largely been accepted as an advantageous addition to Grahamstown's security governance 
network. However the DPS has not unfolded in the manner agreed upon in early negotiations 
with local government. As one member of the SAPS, Inspector (y), stated, ' you can walk up 
to any of those people and they haven' t qualified,' in other words they do not hold the 
required Grade E security qualification. While DPS has the potential to have a positive 
impact on security, in other words lead to a reduction in theft, theft of, or out of motor 
vehicles, and interference with vehicles this is barely materializing. Statistics for the 
Grahamstown police station area l7 register only a slight reduction in theft of motor vehicles 
between the 2003/2004, where there were 270 reported cases and 2004/2005 where there 
were 234 reported cases. Once again difficulties arise with regard to management, 
implementation and regulation. 
Farm watch schemes, another form of responsible citizen response, have also largely ceased 
to exist in the Grahamstown Police Station area. Although this seems perplexing in a country 
ravaged by farm murders, and even stranger in an area where a number of the farmers 
interviewed had lost members of their families to such violence, it is nevertheless the case. 
In discussions with numerous farmers in the Grahamstown Police Station Area it became 
apparent that the highly praised service offered by HiTec has eradicated the need for farm 
watch schemes. Farmers routinely report the rapidity of HiTec's response to their calls for 
assistance. With a company that takes on average nine minutes to reach clients in outlying 
areas, the need for farm watch schemes and all of the management that they entail is 
eradicated. 
Although many of Grahamstown's responsible citizen responses to crime have been 
subsumed by a combination of commercial and state policing initiatives (due to sector 
17 Statistics are not publicly available for the city centre. 
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policing), one initiative in the form of a neighbourhood watch scheme still remains, although 
its informal links with the SAPS make it ever more difficult to term non-state. 
Neighbourhood watch schemes are usually established by members of a particular 
community. From the start, the Grahamstown example was somewhat different. The Fitzroy 
Street neighbourhood watch scheme started in 1997 when the residents of one of the city's 
wealthier suburbs expressed concern over the increasing number of break-ins being 
experienced in the area. The residents approached one of the members of the SAPS, 
Inspector (x) with the idea of setting up patrols in the street. Inspector (x) had just finished 
training a group of police reservists, members of the community who 'perform policing 
duties for the SAPS on a voluntary basis without being paid ' (internet 1) and she thus 
suggested that they patrolled Fitzroy Street as a means of gaining employment for them. 
Every month the residents of the area pay R55 into a pool and the three or four reservists 
(and the more recently employed private security guards) patrol the whole area, which now 
includes a further street, Francis Street. 
The blurring between state and non-state policing is especially apparent in this case for a 
number of reasons. It is a community initiative, and Inspector (x) did subsequently hand over 
all responsibility for the initiative to representatives of the community. However the 
inspector's role in establishing the initiative cannot be ignored and nor can the fact that 
patrols were (originally) carried out by police reservists be disregarded. Although Inspector 
(x) claims that she no longer has any responsibility for the initiative she still confesses to 
playing a mediating role when problems arise. As a result this is effectively a case of a 
partnership between members of the SAPS and a concerned (albeit highly localized) 
community. Whether to delineate this as a state or non-state initiative is thus very difficult 
and it is understandable why it was described by Baker as a form of 'semi-official self-
policing' (Baker 2002:42). 
Like responsible citizen responses, autonomous citizen responses in the Grahamstown Police 
Station Area have become increasingly difficult clearly to demarcate as either public or 
private. This is in no way indicative of the disappearance of vigilantism, but rather of the fact 
that communities have misunderstood their role in sector policing. The discussion on the 
street committees in the extension (x) SPF in Chapter 3 showed how, in the wake of sector 
policing, local communities now understand it as their state-sanctioned right to apprehend 
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and even put on trial and punish criminals. As a result community members no longer see 
autonomous citizen responses as vigilantism but view such activities as a legitimate 
partnership with the SAPS, which as was discussed earlier, is highly unsatisfactory from the 
standpoint of the requirements of democratic policing. Private policing as a whole raises 
particular challenges with regard to each of the elements of democratic policing: equality, 
accountability, justice and efficiency. 
As a number of analysts (see for example Baker, 2001 ; Bayley, 2001; Irish, 2005) have 
pointed out, inherent in private policing is the risk of exacerbating inequality. As Baker 
(2001: I 0) remarks, ' the nature of private policing means that it can offer no equality of 
accessibility and adjudication and at times denies people their constitutional rights.' Access 
to private security depends on, amongst other things (such as location), wealth. 
Commercially driven private security is security for those who can pay for it. In 
Grahamstown this is overwhelmingly apparent. If HiTec services 2800 alarms of which only 
approximately 100 are located in the poorer suburbs of Grahamstown East, then there is 
unquestionably an inequality of access to this service. This results in a situation where 
members of the middle and upper class are privy to a level of security not available to the 
majority of the poor. The fact that Grahamstown is still so divided along racial lines means 
that this class inequality is highly racialised. As critics of the privatization of vital service 
delivery have long argued, privatization may result in an efficient service for those who can 
afford it but in the context of massive social inequalities, it cannot but result in further 
inequality. Although it is unintended, what has transpired is a situation in which the wealthy, 
predominantly white areas in Grahamstown are policed by a predominantly white security 
company. One would be hard pressed not to notice the similarities between the current 
situation and the discriminatory policing practices of the past. It will be shown in the 
conclusion that a number of steps must be taken if one hopes to avoid the benefits of 
pluralized policing being offset by a decline in equity. 
A second core requirement of democratic policing, as has been argued, is that it should 
adhere to high standards of justice and fairness. In Chapter I it was argued that just policing 
requires that individuals are treated fairly and that their integrity and humanity is upheld (The 
Law Commission of Canada report, 2002:23). The nature of private policing is such that it 
can create what Baker (2001) refers to as an 'under-class' of citizens. According to Baker, 
the discourse that operates within private security initiatives is one of ' undesirable elements ' 
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who must be 'cleansed from society by any means possible' (Baker, 2001:11). Although 
extensive observation of the private security companies in Grahamstown suggested that 
physical violence is not be tolerated by either their own management or by the SAPS, 
Baker's notion of an under-class seems nonetheless relevant. The power of discourse to 
construct both circumstances and identities is irrefutable. As a result, references to suspected 
perpetrators of crimes as "skollies ls" and the cautioning of 'undesirable elements' to 'get out 
of town' (implying that they should leave the wealthy suburbs and return to Grahamstown 
East) are of great concern. 
Member of the Armed Response Team to three young men: 
Aside: 
What is the time? Do you see what the time is? It 's 'lala ' [sleep} time 
now, you must 'goduka' [go to bed} .. . 'hamba' [go} ... move on .. . 
serious it's long past bedtime now. 
Those kinds of guys we have to chase out of town 
(Member of the Armed Response Team) 
If democracy is viewed, as it has been argued as 'not just a matter of formal institutions but a 
cluster of values that are widely accepted in society, such as tolerance, political discourse, 
acceptance of majority decisions, political participation, consideration of the communities 
well-being and support for the rule of law' (Baker, 2001: 12), then unfairly identifying 
individuals as undesirable elements on the basis of their' location or ethnicity' is unjust and 
therefore undemocratic. 
The third standard by which a system's democratic credentials are commonly measured is 
that of accountability. One of the most frequently voiced concerns relating to private security 
is the problem of accountability. As Herbert Howe has pointed out, many critics have 
'labeled private security companies as threats to global security because of alleged non-
18 A skollie is an offensive and slang South African term used to describe ' a young man, usually black 
or mixed race, who is involved in petty crime and violence and often belongs to a gang ' ( In ternet 2). 
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accountability' (1998:3). Baker agrees, arguing that due to the fact that private policing is 
'determined by its instigators and not by its clients,' that it is an essentially ' autocratic rather 
than democratic ' practice (Baker 2001 :11). As of yet private security officers are accountable 
only to their own clients, and not to all the citizens who might be affected by their practices 
(Bayley, 1996:7). Genuine accountability will necessitate finding ways of making the private 
security accountable not only to their clientele, but to the general public too. 
Finally, any system of policing cannot only be measured in terms of standards of equality, 
justice and accountability. It also needs to be providing a service that is efficient. There are 
many potential difficulties that can arise as a result of private policing methods which affect 
society broadly and not just a firm's clientele. Most obviously, the nature of private policing 
means that it can offer no equality of accessibility and, as a result, members of the middle 
and upper class are privy to a level of security not available to the majority of the poor. 
Another concern which has been voiced by many informants throughout this study is the old 
notion that violence begets violence. The contention is that the fact that perpetrators know 
that they are likely to be interrupted by an armed security guard will not dissuade them from 
committing crime, but will rather encourage them to carry a weapon of their own. As Irish 
(2005) contends 'the more armed good guys there are out there, the more guns the bad guys 
will carry. ' Almost all of the armed response team I had dealings with alluded to this fact in 
one way or another. 
Ya ... they 're getting dangerous now! This old guy (*) was chasing after 
he 'd broke into a car in African Street.. . he was running down towards 
the driffY'9 and J chased him too and (*) got stabbed with a big panga 
like this and then he called me and said "watch oUl for the knife" and 
while J was trying to pull my gun out he tried to stab me ... ya J must 
show you all the knives and stuff we 've took off people ... its actually 
crazy .. . they 're definitely not scared of us anymore. 
(Member of the Armed Response Team) 
Another way in which the impact of private security practices on society is not restricted to a 
firm's clients alone is suggested by Baker who argues that the private police could playa role 
in delegitimizing the public police. If citizens do not look to the state as the primary 
19 Both state and non-state police personnel refer to the cities drainage systems as "driff}!'s." The 
drains, like the railway lines, are a major security problem as they create a relatively protected escape 
route from the wealthier suburbs back out towards Grahamstown East. 
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guarantors of their security, the state could be said to lose a great deal of its relevance. Baker 
takes this further to suggest that there is a risk that a 'view of the state police as irrelevant 
will extend to seeing the state itself as irrelevant' (Baker 2004: 184). If citizens' engagement 
with the state is a prerequisite of democracy then individuals opting not to engage with the 
state as a result of its failure to provide security is of serious consequence, particularly for a 
fledgling constitutional order in which the legitimacy of liberal democratic norms and 
institutions is by no means firmly entrenched. 
The effects of non-state policing on the democratic institutions and processes in South Africa 
illustrate why Scharf has argued that 'non-state forms of policing go to the heart of the social 
contract in each country' (2000: 5). The key question which is raised by the complex mix of 
overlapping public and private policing that characterizes the provision of security in 
contemporary South Africa was posed by the Mail and Guardian (2005/05/05): how do we 
ensure that we do not develop a society with parallel justice systems where the wealthy have 
greater access into the justice system than the poor? 
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CONCLUSION 
In 2004 Baker wrote that there was 'a dearth of data and analysis concerning the nature of 
contemporary policing in Africa, the effect of fragmentation of policing on justice, 
accountability, and quality of service, and the actions of governments to control and hold 
accountable all forms of policing' (2004a: 183). By mapping Grahamstown's security 
governance network and considering the problems and prospects for democratic policing 
facing the city, this thesis hopes to have made a contribution to understanding some of the 
challenges facing the transformation of policing in South Africa's democratic order. 
It was stated at the outset of the thesis that South Africa has a crime problem and a policing 
problem (Leggett, 2005). What became apparent throughout my research, both in the 
abundance of secondary sources addressed and in the empirical investigation is that while the 
SAPS work continually to address the first problem there has been little real success in 
addressing the second (Leggett, 2005). The irony is that real solutions to the problem of 
crime are highly dependent upon dealing with the problem of policing. 
Although, as it has been shown, non-state policing cannot ensure that there is equal provision 
and access to security, the SAPS are (at present) too lacking in available resources for them 
simply to absorb private initiatives (Baker, 2004a: 183). Thus the obvious conclusion is that 
government must prioritize the establishment of formal partnerships between the different 
nodes in any given security governance network and ensure that adequate arrangements exist 
to monitor and control each of the elements if it hopes to give its citizens the closest possible 
approximation of genuine democratic policing. As Baker argued ' if non-state ordering is 
inevitable and indispensable, then many see the immediate task as at least bringing the 
"responsible" elements under statutory legislation, so that non-state policing is more fully 
accountable to the public and fit to be a partner in the security network' (Baker, 2004a: 184). 
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One thing that became apparent during the process of mapping Grahamstown's security 
governance network is that the Grahamstown case offers an explicit manifestation of the 
contention that the borders between the different forn1s of policing - public and private - are 
blurring (Baker, 2002; Irish, 1999; Bayley, 1996; Buur and Jensen, 2004). The types of 
policing that unfold in any given area do so in response to the needs of that particular 
locality. In addition to this, the extent to which policing in any particular locality is effective 
and democratic is dependent on the particularities of the security governance network that 
develops in that area. Policing in Grahamstown has been shown to have a fluid and dynamic 
nature. Any endeavor to create effective and democratic policing in this small Eastern Cape 
Town will have to take into account the particularities of the station area at any given time. 
In the same way as the distinction between public and private forms of policing cannot be 
rigidly drawn, democracy cannot be viewed in terms of a dichotomy of democracy/no 
democracy (Baker, 2002b: 141). Democracy should be seen on a continuum and thus 
democratic reform should be viewed as a continual 'process' rather than as an attempt at an 
end product (Marx in Brogden and Nijhar 2005:234). Policing in Grahamstown is not 
flawlessly democratic, but neither is it completely undemocratic. 
Accountability suffers as a result of structural difficulties associated with attempts to regulate 
an increasingly complex policing network through 'traditional legal approaches administered 
by the traditional centralized state justice apparatus' (Shearing and Kempa, 2000:209). It is 
extremely difficult to effectively monitor democratic policing in Grahamstown from Pretoria. 
Genuine accountability will involve finding 'new ways of observing policing as it happens, 
and not merely setting up some form of post hoc accountability' (Jones, Newburn and Smith, 
1996: 12). Grahamstown policing needs to be accountable to multiple bodies at multiple local 
and national levels if policing is to be genuinely accountable. 
Sector policing is trying to install accountability mechanisms at multiple local levels, but a 
number of problems remain. Firstly the lack of formal partnerships between state and non-
state policing means that presently sector policing is only designed to keep the SAPS 
accountable. This means that while the SAPS might be increasingly accountable at multiple 
local levels, other policing initiatives are not subject to the kinds of processes that make the 
public police more accountable (see for example Irish, 2000:30). It would be prudent to 
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establish a forum in which the question of how to create the aforementioned modes of 
regulation could be discussed. 
Genuine accountability will involve finding innovative ways of monitoring policing as it 
happens (Jones, Newburn and Smith, 1996 : 12). For such traditions to develop, the South 
African government, and more importantly local government, needs to redefine 
understandings of accountability and find ways to educate its citizens about their role in the 
new regulatory system. According to Loader, understanding of accountability needs to 
develop from a purely political conception of accountability to an understanding which 
includes also ' the responsibility of individuals and organizations to take care in managing 
their own crime risks and to assume a portion of the blame if they fail to do so' (2000:33 1). 
Failing to educate and subsequently mobilize citizens will hamper attempts at creating 
genuine accountability on a societal level. 
Establishing effective internal disciplinary structures within policing bodies (both state and 
non-state) should have been a priority at the outset of democratic reform (Bayley, 2001 :39). 
However this has not materialized. All actors in Grahamstown's security governance network 
must have efficient and accessible systems in place for both receiving grievances against 
personnel and for conducting investigations against the aforementioned (Bruce & Nei ld, 
2005:38). While the SAPS is the only policing initiative in the Grahamstown Police Station 
Area that can be credited with internal accountability mechanisms, these measures are not 
fully effective. This is an extremely worrisome situation in light of Bruce & Neild's 
contention that ' the effectiveness of internal systems is a measure of the degree to which the 
police agency is committed to ensuring that its members adhere to the high standards which 
are required of democratic police' (2005:39). Unless formal pa11nerships are formed amongst 
key role players in the security governance network the problems associated with the 
privatization of security will persist, while the potential strengths of private security will be 
overlooked. 
If a restructured and formalised security governance network is to avoid aggravating existing 
inequalities then institutional means of linking the networks to the 'public' or 'common 
good' have to be found (Loader 2000:335). Formally linking up the different nodes of the 
security governance network does not necessitate an abandonment of sector policing, but the 
incorporation (by government) of the notions of partnership policing and security governance 
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into the concept of sector policing. Grahamstown's security governance network, although 
unquestionably constituted by a complex web of policing initiatives, still lacks formal 
policing partnerships. Partnerships exist, in an ad hoc manner, out of necessity, but nothing 
has been formalized. This seems a strange situation when the SAPS are desperately 
understaffed and members of both commercial and community policing bodies are interested 
in building closer relationships. Nevertheless, the point is that while partnerships remain 
informal they fail to take advantage of the benefits of pluralized policing. The Grahamstown 
SAPS frequently claim that they welcome partnerships with private policing bodies and 
private policing bodies report how anxious they are to work with the SAPS, but there seems 
to be little attempt to effectively capitalize on this cooperation. 
With the acceptance that state policing bodies are no longer able independently to provide for 
security of the citizens and with the recognition that private agencies (in all of their forms) 
are increasingly contributing to governance, a number of theorists (see for example Shearing 
and Kempa 2000; Loader 2000) argue that private policing initiatives need official ly to be 
incorporated into the ambit of governance and policing in South Africa. As Howe argues, 
because the 'role of private security companies is clearly growing, governments and 
international organizations should seek to regulate them rather than eliminate them' (1998:3). 
Although the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security stresses the role and participation of 
actors outside of the ambit of the SAPS within the country 's social crime prevention 
framework, its lack of guidance regarding the practical establishment of such partnerships 
has resulted in a situation where genuine co-operative initiatives are largely lacking. Where 
such co-operation has been fostered it is usually 'without the formal recognition of the SAPS 
management and without due acknowledgement of the legal implications of these initiatives' 
(Minnaar,1999:1). 
According to Shearing and Kempa, private security (in all of its forms) is hugely 
complementary to traditional state conceptions of what policing entails. Private policing 
initiatives in Grahamstown have been shown to go beyond the bounds of duty and to be 
directly responsive to both the fear of crime exhibited by people in their locality, as well as 
the circumstances that jeopardize security in the locality. The time has come for the 
government to directly engage the private sector (Shearing and Kempa, 2000). 
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According to Shearing and Kempa (2000) there is a considerable role for private security to 
play in policing democratic South Africa. They suggest that through formally' linking up and 
networking - all these forms of non-state policing nodes both amongst themselves and with 
state structures, many of the strengths of private nodes of governance can be maximized 
while many of the problems ... relating to the commoditization of security can be minimized, 
[thus] optimizing democratic policing outcomes' (Shearing and Kempa, 2000:206). The 
adoption and implementation of sector policing is indicative of the fact that steps are being 
taken to establish partnerships at local levels, but gaps in this approach remain. 
Most obviously, the commercial private security industry has been left somewhat in the cold 
regarding the role that they can play in policing South Africa under sector policing. Not only 
does this create an obstacle to effective policing but it also hinders attempts to deal with the 
problems for democratic policing that commercial private policing initiatives generate. In 
addition to the aforementioned, not formally including commercial private security initiatives 
into the security governance network is worrying when it is increasingly accepted that there 
is a substantial and positive role for 'private security to play in governing nations like South 
Africa through the transition to healthy democracy and beyond'(Shearing and Kempa, 
2000:205). 
One suggestion is that the police could hire members of private security compames to 
undertake basic duties such as the policing of events like sports matches, or the transporting 
of prisoners to court thus leaving the SAPS to focus on more pressing issues like trying to 
balance the unequal provision of security in town. The DPS arrangement, if properly 
implemented and carefully regulated, could greatly assist the SAPS by removing some of the 
burden of policing in the CBD. As William Sessions (1997), a former member of the Federal 
Bureau ofInvestigations observed, 'the private sector ... can supplement very well and easily 
some of the responsibilities law enforcement cannot react to ... it's not inconsistent with any 
law enforcement agency to accept well organized support for the community' (cited in 
Minnaar, 1999: 16). 
The security industry increasingly makes requests for partnership policing in South Africa, 
and the 'debate around the extension of powers of the private security industry has received 
considerable publicity' (Irish, 1999: I 0). Minnaar (1999: I) has suggested a number of 
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reforms which would go a long way to enabling meaningful partnerships between South 
Africa's private security industry and the SAPS: 
• patrolling of neighborhoods should be carried out In conjunction with the 
SAPS; 
• full powers of arrest, search and seizure have been requested; 
• security companies, by law, should be entitled to transport citizens that they 
have arrested to the nearest police station. This would not only be a more 
efficient practice, but it would also take pressure off the SAPS as it would 
mean that they did not have to unnecessarily attend the scene of arrest; 
• security companies arn1ed/rapid response vehicles should be classified as 
emergency vehicles and be permitted to exceed the speed limit in emergency 
situations. 
Effective and democratic policing in Grahamstown (and South Africa) requires inclusion of 
the notion of 'security governance' in the newly devised philosophy of sector policing. 
Shearing and Kempa (2000) propose the introduction of 'networked nodal governance,' 
while Loader and Walker (2001) recommend what they refer to as 'coordinated governance.' 
This conception 'permits us to recognise that, today, the police are only one node in a 
network of auspices . . . that work to govern security alone and in conjunction with each other' 
(Shearing, 2005:58). This innovative policing arrangement is conceived in such a way as to 
assign importance to the comprehensive participation of a locality's citizens (including all 
forms of non-state policing) in decision-making about security issues. The state's role thus 
formally develops from one in which it is expected to exercise a monopoly over policing to 
one in which it is expected to 'steer' effective, accountable, equitable and just service 
delivery, and coordinate the relationships within a formalized security governance network 
(Loader, 2001 :27). The questions that emerge, as Shearing (2005:61) observes, are related to 
how best to coordinate, integrate and fund the various forms of policing within the security 
governance network. 
The failure to capitalize on the benefits of a properly established and interdependent security 
governance network in the Grahamstown Police Station Area is undeniably a result of the 
fact that there is a desperate need in South Africa, at the state level, to define the role of the 
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different types of policing initiatives and coordinate interaction within the country 's security 
governance networks. 
Government must begin by ' reformulating its understanding of the role of the state in 
governing security' (Shearing and Kempa, 2000:210), which according to Loader (2000:336) 
requires more 'radical thinking' and more ' imaginative institution building. ' The SAPS 
should not itself be viewed as a public good, but rather that the outcome of security should 
(see for example Shearing and Kempa, 2000:210). As a result Shearing and Kempa argue 
that the role of the state should be more focused on funding and facilitating citizens' access 
to security rather than limiting its role to the funding of the state police. 
In addition to a reformulation of the state's role in providing access to security, the South 
African government needs to clearly define their reformulated conception of policing and 
establish principles that outline exactly what it proposes policing in South Africa will look 
like, and what it should accomplish. As Baker writes, 'a democratically representative 
government has the authority to clearly define the desired relationship between the different 
policing structures and to set the parameters' (2004b:220). 
Defining the relationship between the different nodes in the security governance network, 
facilitating citizens' access to security, and setting certain limits will entail a number of steps. 
It will firstly entail accepting a new definition of policing, which goes beyond the SAPS and 
recognizes the role other actors in the network can potentially play in providing for the 
security of citizens. This does not imply the disappearance of state policing but rather an 
acceptance that an assumed state monopoly over security provision is no longer defensible. 
This new vision of policing 'would see the police forming the centre point of a coordinated 
[and formalized] system of patrol services, wherein they would act as guardians of the public 
interest' (Blair, 1998 cited in Loader, 2000:336). 
As the Pattern Commission (1999) found, the first and foremost requirement of democratic 
policing is the protection of human rights. Additionally, democratic policing must 'seek to 
mobilize local knowledge and capacity in both the direction and delivery of policing and be 
responsive to local needs, as well as be transparent and accountable through democratic 
practices' (Pattern Commission in Shearing and Kempa, 2000:210). 
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Policing boards could playa number of roles including: 'consultation with a range of players 
with an interest in promoting security - including but not limited to the public police, paid 
private security agencies, local grassroots organizations, and community members; facilitate 
the implementation and maintenance of such programmes by acting as the funding agency 
controlling the flow of public funds into the networked approaches to security; acting as an 
overall monitoring body to hold all agencies participating in the networked process of 
policing accountable' (ibid). 
In sum, it is necessary for government to develop and put to use more local agencies, 
structures and capacities for monitoring and checking the activity of private security bodies. 
(Shearing and Kempa, 2000:210) This can arguably be achieved if active Sector Policing 
Forums can be established, however it would be wise to bear in mind that partnerships of all 
types require a great deal of effort on the part of the participants. While increased levels of 
crime and insecurity exist, history indicates that people are willing to mobilize, however as 
crime and insecurity decrease, so participation in community initiatives often diminishes 
(Scharf, Saban and Hauck, 2001). 
One of the biggest problems envisaged for effective sector policing in Grahamstown is the 
ability of sector managers to mobilize community members and involve all of the necessary 
stakeholders (Scharf, 2000) thus ensuring that SPFs represent the community in its entirety 
rather than merely specific groups. As Maroga (2004) observed, if SPFs 'fail to mobilize the 
community, they are likely to find themselves in a similar trap as community policing forums 
i.e. serving the needs of certain interest groups rather than that of the entire community' 
(Maroga,2004:7). 
In Closing: 
After briefly introducing policing and establishing certain principles of democratic policing, 
this thesis has illustrated how the security governance network in Grahamstown is currently 
operating. In the process of portraying the fluid and dynamic nature of policing in 
Grahamstown, the prospects and problems for democracy were discussed in the hope of 
offering insight into how these challenges might be overcome. 
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The intent of this thesis was not to create an archetypal model from which government and 
local police station areas must not veer. Rather it aimed to show the potential benefits - in 
terms of both effectiveness and the advancement of democracy - of formalizing the 
partnerships that already exist in an ad hoc manner, and to suggest how government needs to 
start thinking about reconfiguring the governance of security in South Africa if we are to 
succeed in meeting the twin challenges of combating an unacceptably high crime rate and 
inculcating democratic policing. 
A formalized security governance network, existing under the ambit of sector policing, has 
the potential to produce an effective and democratic system of policing in post apartheid 
South Africa. 
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